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Counterspeech as an Alternative to
Prohibition: Proposed Federal Regulation of
Tobacco Promotion in American Motorsport
DAVID A. LOCKE*
Whatever it is permitted to do, it must be permitted to advise to do. The
question is doubtful only when the instigator derives a personal benefit
from his advice; when he makes it his occupation, for subsistence or
pecuniary gain, to promote what society and the State consider to be an
evil.... The case is one of those which lie on the exact boundary line
between two principles, and it is not at once apparent to which of the two
it properly belongs. There are arguments on both sides.'
INTRODUCTION
On January 2, 1971, the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969
banned cigarette advertising on television and radio and required manufac-
turers to include warning labels on all cigarette packaging.2 In 1984,
following further investigation of the health hazards of cigarette smoking,
Congress strengthened the language of package warning labels and required
that similar warnings be included in all types of cigarette advertising.' The
Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986, promul-
gated by the Federal Trade Commission, similarly banned electronic media
advertising and required comparable warning labels on smokeless tobacco
product packages and print advertisements. But these and other governmental
efforts to encourage current tobacco users to quit and to decrease the initiation
of tobacco use have yielded little success. Congressional findings show that
tobacco use is not only the largest preventable cause of illness and death, but
* J.D. Candidate, 1995, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A., 1992, Butler
University. I wish to thank Patrick Baude, professor of law at Indiana University, for his constructive
comments on the first draft of this Note. Special thanks to Charles and Anetha Locke for their support
and encouragement, and to Professor Philip Powlick of DePauw University for suggesting the topic to
this former racer. This Note is dedicated to the memory of three-time Drivers World Champion Ayrton
Senna da Silva (1960-1994), whose passion and dedication to excellence set the standard by which all
others are measured.
1. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 97-98 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1988). The Act, as amended, now reads: "After January 1, 1971, it shall be
unlawful to advertise cigarettes and little cigars on any medium of electronic communication subject to
the jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission."
According to one commentator, the tobacco industryfavored the electronic media ban, simply because
it was preferable to the highly effective anti-smoking commercials mandated by the FCC under the
Fairness Doctrine. Kenneth L. Polin, Argumentfor the Ban of Tobacco Advertising: A First Amendment
Analysis, 17 HOFsTRA L. Rav. 99, 102 (1988).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1333. The Comprehensive Smoking Education Act also increased the size of
warning labels and provided for periodic rotation of various anti-smoking messages.
4. Id. §§ 4401-4408.
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also the number one underlying cause of death in the United States today,
resulting in more than 450,000 deaths each year.
Because congressional legislation has regulated tobacco advertising only in
certain areas, such as television, radio, and print advertisements, tobacco
manufacturers have tended to transfer promotional spending to areas not
subject to restriction. Companies such as Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds
have invested heavily in sponsoring sporting events, underwriting the cost of
events as well as that of billboards, print ads, and other advertising media
related to the promotion and marketing of such events.( Since the advent of
the ban on television cigarette advertising, corporate tobacco sponsors have
effectively circumvented the prohibition through active promotion of their
products at televised sporting events.7 One of the most visible sports on
television is motor racing,8 with media coverage of the sport paralleling the
rapid growth of the tobacco industry's promotional efforts. Indianapolis 500
winner Bobby Rahal put it succinctly: "Today, I'd say that 90 percent of the
sponsors are not auto-related .... Tobacco companies cannot advertise on
television, but when there is an Indy car race televised, the logo is seen
everytime [sic] the camera focuses in on a car."9 Second only (in attendance
and viewership) to football as a spectator sport in the United States, 0 racing
has become one of the more glamorous means by which tobacco companies
maintain visibility" in the face of gradually declining sales.'
In recent years, congressional activity has centered on the rising percentage
of tobacco advertising and promotional expenses transferred to activities not
currently required to display health warnings.' Representative Mike Synar
5. H.R. 2147, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1993).
6. Susan A. Wichmann & D.R. Martin, Sports and Tobacco: The Smoke Has Yet to Clear,
PHYSICIAN & SPORTSMEDICINE, Nov. 1991, at 125, 126; CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, CIGARETrE
ADVERTISING-UNrIrED STATES, 1988 39 MMWR 261 (1990) ("In 1988, cigarette advertising and
promotional expenditures related to the sponsorship of sporting events were $84.0 million ... and
included sponsorship, newspaper advertising, and other expenditures.").
7. Wichmann & Martin, supra note 6, at 126-27. Alan Davis, then-vice president for public issues
at the American Cancer Society, claimed that "[s]ports sponsorships have always been the tobacco
industry's way of keeping its name in front of the active, sporting youth of America." Id.
8. The ESPN cable sports network now televises an average of 65 races (not counting reruns) each
year, including Formula One, IndyCar, NASCAR, IMSA, NHRA, and IHRA events. Michael Vega, The
Stocks are Rising, BOSTON GLOBE, July 9, 1993, at 59.
9. William D. Murray, CART's Future Cloudy at Best, UPI, Oct. 4, 1985, available in LEXIS,
News Library, ARCNWS File.
10. Alan Blum, The Marlboro Grand Prix: Circumvention of the Television Ban on Tobacco
Advertising, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 913, 914 (1991).
11. A study conducted by a trade magazine found that 75% of the more than $80 million tobacco
companies spend each year on "event" sponsorships goes to sports. For R.J. Reynolds, manufacturer of
Winston and Camel cigarette brands and one of the largest tobacco marketers in the United States, the
biggest sport has been auto racing. Jeanne Whalen, Cigarette Interest Flags in Racing, ADVERTISING
AGE, Dec. 6, 1993, at 28.
12. According to one journalist, "The number of cigarettes sold in the USA has dropped each year
since 1981 and is expected to continue falling 2% to 3% a year." James Cox, Tobacco Issue Still Burns,
USA TODAY, June 25, 1992, at BI, B2. Philip Morris reports that its domestic tobacco shipments fell
2.9% against a total domestic industry shipment decline of 0.5%. PHILIP MORRIS COMPANIES, INC., 1992
ANNUAL REPORT 16 (1993).
13. H.R. 3614, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1993).
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(D-OK) first introduced legislation in 1986 seeking a total ban on advertising
and promotion of tobacco products, 4 and versions of the Bill received
consideration through the 1990 session. 5 Following a brief period during
which tobacco advertising legislation lay dormant, proponents of restriction
have renewed their efforts, hoping to capitalize on current political interest in
health issues.' 6 While congressional proponents of restrictions on tobacco
advertising assert that tobacco companies use promotional activities in such
sports as motor racing to attract minors, 7 spokespersons for the tobacco
companies maintain that their advertising and promotions are intended only
to increase brand loyalty or to persuade existing smokers to change brands.' 8
Regardless of the motives, one thing is clear: Corporate use of motorsports
as a commercial tool to sell tobacco products is at the center of a growing
First Amendment debate. 9 Both sides of the controversy claim that restric-
tion or prohibition of tobacco advertising is an issue that goes beyond
commercial speech and the right to market a lawful product. For advocates of
free speech, the question is whether a society should manipulate its citizens'
behavior by censoring the type of information they receive.20 Proponents of
restriction or prohibition, however, point out that the issue is not one of
censorship, but rather a matter of good health principles and sound planning
for the well-being of future generations.2'
After years of empirical study, the adverse effects of tobacco use on human
health are well documented.22 Health hazards of the magnitude associated
with tobacco use clearly implicate the federal government's substantial
14. H.1L 4972, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
15. H.R. 5041, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); H.R. 1493, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R. 1532,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 1272, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
16. H.R. 3614, supra note 13; H.R. 2147, supra note 5. When the House of Representatives
adjourned from the second and final session'of the 103d Congress on October 7, 1994, no action had
been taken on either House Bill 3614 or House Bill 2147. Presumably, comparable legislation will be
introduced during the 104th Congress.
17. H.R. 5041, supra note 15, § 2; see also H.R. 3614, supra note 13, § 2.
18. Janis Carr, Sponsorship Hard Habit to Break: Marriage of Tobacco, Alcohol and Sports under
Attack CHI. TRIB., Oct. 23, 1988, at 18; see also Wes Raynal, Butt Out: Smoking Foes Want Tobacco
Out of Racing, Others See It As Infringing Free Speech, AUTOWEEK, May 30, 1994, at 18, 20.
19. See, e.g., Tobacco Issues: Hearings on California's Antismoking Advertisements and
Shareholder Attempts to Stop Cigarette Advertising Before the Subcomm. on Transportation and
Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 56-89
(1990) (statements of Beth W. Bressan, vice president and assistant to the president of the
CBS/Broadcast Group; Richard P. Gitter, vice president of advertising standards of the NBC Television
Network; Alfred R. Schneider, vice president of policy and standards of Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.; Edwin
M. Durso, senior vice president and general counsel of ESPN, Inc.) (addressing the amount of broadcast
time dedicated to the coverage of motorsports).
20. Tape of Conference on Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, held by Boston
University's College of Communication through its Institute for Democratic Communication, Free
Speech and Advertising- Who Draws the Line? (Apr. 1987) [hereinafter Free Speech and Advertising].
The tape carries the message, "This program was made possible by a grant from Philip Morris U.S.A."
Former FTC Chairman Michael Pertschuk declined an invitation to participate in the conference,
saying, "'It's as if the Mafia had sponsored a colloquium on RICO [the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations law]."' LARRY C. WHrrE, MERCHANTS OF DEATH: THE AMERICAN TOBACCO
INDUSTRY 220 (1988).
21. Free Speech and Advertising, supra note 20.
22. H.R. 2147, supra note 5, § 2.
1994]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
interest in protecting its citizens' health, particularly that of minors. The
various legislative proposals currently under consideration range from outright
prohibition of tobacco promotion to partial restriction. But only the latter
scheme, which would compel dissemination of counterspeech about the health
effects of tobacco use in proportion to the sponsor's commercial involvement,
would further the federal government's substantial interest in a manner
consistent with the principles of the First Amendment. This type of legislation
would meet the constitutional standard of narrowly tailoring the restriction
and would advance a First Amendment interest in giving the people more
information rather than less.
This Note analyzes the constitutional issues implicated in the restriction of
tobacco sports advertising and promotion in light of current Supreme Court
commercial speech doctrine. Specifically, this Note addresses the probable
impact of tobacco advertising regulation on the sport of motor racing by
highlighting current tobacco company involvement. Part I considers the
competing interests involved in the marriage of tobacco and motorsports. Part
II discusses the history of tobacco advertising legislation, tracking the changes
from House Bill 1493 through the most recent examples, House Bill 3614 and
the alternative Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") bill, House Bill 2147.
Part III tests the constitutionality of the various legislative schemes. This Note
concludes that although a congressional ban on tobacco sports advertising and
promotion passes constitutional muster under the commercial speech doctrine,
legislation which compels counterspeech offers the superior alternative by
advancing the interests of the First Amendment.
I. COMPETING INTERESTS IN THE TOBACCO-
MOTORSPORTS MARRIAGE
Members of the racing community typically are willing to overlook the
apparent contradiction between athletic activity and tobacco use because of
the massive support American motorsports receives from corporate tobacco
sponsorship.23 Most racers assert the right of a manufacturer to market a
legal product without interference from the federal government.2" But for the
anti-tobacco forces, the link between tobacco sports promotion and the image
of sport is overly persuasive, particularly in the case of adolescents, and must
be eliminated as a first step toward resolving the tobacco problem. For those
opposed to tobacco use, the effect of lost tobacco sponsorship on motorsports
is irrelevant." This Part examines both the nature of tobacco's relationship
23. Following the 1993 Indianapolis 500, Emerson Fittipaldi commented from the winner's circle,
"Marlboro is back up." Bob Oates, See Through the Smoke-Don't Ban Cigarettes, Ban Cigarette
Promotion, L.A. TIMEs, May 1, 1994, at C3, C9. Fittipaldi, a two-time Indianapolis 500 winner (1989
& 1993) and two-time Drivers World Champion (1972 & 1974), employs a personal trainer and follows
a strict dietary regimen to maintain peak physical conditioning. Like most top racing drivers, Fittipaldi
does not use tobacco products.
24. See infra note 46.
25. Proponents of a ban on tobacco sports promotion decry the complicity of the motorsports
community. Recently, a reporter for the Los Angeles Times summarized the viewpoint, asking
rhetorically "whether a sport deserves to exist if it can't operate without creating addicts to a deadly
substance." Oates, supra note 23, at C9.
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with motorsports and the results of studies on the link between tobacco
promotion and consumption.
A. Sporting and Commercial Interests
For the partners in the tobacco-motorsports marriage, the union clearly is
mutually beneficial. In the early 1970's when R.J. Reynolds began its
association with the National Association of Stock Car Auto Racing
("NASCAR"), racing was largely a regional sport.26 NASCAR president Bill
France, Jr., credits R.J. Reynolds with the sport's rise to national prominence,
not only because of the company's promotional efforts, but through its
example that racing sponsorship need not come solely from manufacturers of
automotive-related products.27 R.J. Reynolds' pioneering efforts have helped
change the face of racing in the years since the advent of the television
advertising ban.28 In return, motor racing enthusiasts are particularly
appreciative of those who support their sport:
Both CART and NASCAR point to studies that show auto racing fans
are the "most loyal" of fans who attend sporting events. One survey found
that 61 percent of race fans say their purchasing decisions would be
influenced by a company's support of motorsports. This factoid is
paramount in building brand recognition and corporate identity....
26. Vega, supra note 8, at 59.
27. Id. Although NASCAR's affiliation with R.J. Reynolds marked the beginning of tobacco
company involvement with motorsports in the United States, the British Lotus Grand Prix team set the
tone for corporate tobacco sponsorship in 1968, following the British ban on television advertising of
cigarettes. A British Broadcasting Company ("BBC") documentary notes that "[Lotus team owner] Colin
Chapman took out a competition license in the name of Gold Leaf Team Lotus, and sprayed the cars
red and white, like a Gold Leaf package, and really, that was the start of real money in motor racing."
The Power and the Glory: The Revolutionaries (BBC Lionheart Television, 1991) (remarks of John
Cooper, former owner of the now-disbanded Cooper Grand Prix racing team).
28. According to one periodical, R. Reynolds "spends more than $20 million each year on auto
racing." Geoffrey N. Smith, Daytona Dreaming, FINANCIAL WORLD, Apr. 12, 1994, at 10. A chart
accompanying a recenf newspaper article partially documents the investment of cigarette companies in
American motorsports since the enactment of the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969. Through
1991, R.J. Reynolds spent the following amounts on event and series point funds: NASCAR Winston
Cup Series, $17.2 million (1971-1991); IMSA Camel GT, $6.0 million (1971-1991); NHRA Winston
Drag Racing, $8.8 million (1974-1991); Camel Pro Series, $3.6 million (1974-1991); Camel Supercross,
$0.4 million (1989-1991); TOTAL: $36.0 million. For Philip Morris, event and series point fund money
paid in the CART IndyCar series amounted to the following: Marlboro Challenge, $4.9 million (1987-
1991); Marlboro 500, $3.8 million (1987-1989); Marlboro Championship Trail, $1.1 million (1970-
1991); TOTAL: $9.8 million. The author notes that these dollar figures do not include team sponsorship
fees. Research indicates that Philip Morris sponsorship of the Marlboro Racing Team has required an
investment of $10.0 million per year since 1986. Selena Roberts, Making Sport of Cigarette Ad Law?
Critics Charge the Tobacco Industry's Sponsorship of Motor Sports is an Advertising Tool that Hurts
Youngsters, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., May 25, 1992, at Al.
Since 1991, Philip Morris' Marlboro sponsorship has gone to the Penske IndyCar team, which ran
two cars painted in the distinctive red chevron logotype during the 1992 and 1993 seasons. According
to Ernie Saxton, publisher of Motorsports Marketing News, the addition in 1994 of a third Marlboro
Penske car for Al Unser, Jr., represented an $8.0 million commitment by Philip Morris. Whalen, supra
note 11, at 28.
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It is not unreasonable to say motorsports' growth benefited greatly
when Phillip Morris [sic] and R.J. Reynolds took their advertising show to
the road courses and ovals.29
Market share is of great importance to companies in a declining, "mature"
market such as tobacco,3 ° and despite some recent reductions in event and
series sponsorship designed to optimize investment,31 tobacco companies
have no intention of voluntarily relinquishing the exposure gained through
their association with motorsports.32 Specifically, television coverage of
racing events with which tobacco products are associated affords tobacco
marketers promotional opportunities that money cannot buy directly.33 A
Michigan research firm that provides documentation of the amount of
exposure sponsors obtain during nationally televised sporting events shows
that in 1993, tobacco companies participating in the various major American
racing series received a total of nearly thirty-four hours of televised in-focus
exposure time.34 The firm, Joyce Julius and Associates, Inc., defines in-focus
29. Dutch Mandel, Racing for Dollars: Corporate America Likes the Return on Investment in
Motorsports, AUToWEEK, Dec. 4, 1989, at 61, 65-66. CART is an acronym for Championship Auto
Racing Teams, the organizing body of the 16-race IndyCar series.
30. A mature market is, in essence, a no-growth market that necessarily decreases in size through
consumer attrition. Tobacco companies insist that market expansion is not a corporate goal. See, e.g.,
Tobacco Advertising: Hearings on H.R. 1272 and H.R. 1532 Before the Subcomm. on Health and the
Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 113-17 (1987)
[hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 1272 and H.R. 1532] (statement of Scott Ward, professor of marketing,
the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania). But see Tobacco Control and Marketing: Hearings
on H.R. 5041 Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 385 (1990) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 5041] (statement of Mark
Green, commissioner of consumer affairs, New York City) ("Advertising experts agree that market
expansion, especially for an industry that loses over two million consumers a year who die or quit, is
an important objective of nearly all advertising.").
31. Whalen, supra note I I, at 28. RI. Reynolds ended its 22-year Camel association with the
International Motor Sports Association ("IMSA") at the close of the 1993 season.' Though it had been
rumored that R.J. Reynolds would pull the Camel sponsorship due to an imminent change in the
specifications of the series' prototype cars (which reduced media coverage), R.J. Reynolds Program
Manager Larry Kiger cited the price wars between Reynolds and Philip Morris, stating that "'[the
decision was not driven by what's going on or what's not going on in sports car racing. Our marketing
needs changed drastically over the past two years, which has changed the way we must market our
product."' Camel Out, Exxon In, ON TRACK, Oct. 22, 1993, at 7.
32. Attendance at American racing events has steadily increased in recent years. In 1993, major
racing series with tobacco company involvement yielded the following total attendance statistics, with
1992 totals in parentheses: NASCAR Winston Cup stock cars-4,020,220 (3,699,833); CART IndyCar
& USAC Indianapolis 500-3,064,180 (2,946,327); NHRA Winston Drag Racing-,738,000
(1,598,003); IMSA Camel GT prototype cars--587,500 (716,500); NASCAR Winston West stock
cars-480,500 (441,400). GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO., 1993 AUTO RACING ATrENDANCE 7 (1994).
33. Alison Muscatine, Sports and Tobacco: Relationship under Fire, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1991,
at CI (quoting Northeastern University law professor Richard Danar).
34. JOYCE JULIUS & ASSOCIATES, 11 SPONSORS REPORT No. 20, 1993 PPG INDYCAR WORLD
SERIES YEAR-END REPORT, at 2,4-6 (1993) [hereinafter INDYCAR YEAR-END REPORT]; JOYCE JULIUS
& ASSOCIATES, 9 SPONSORS REPORT NO. 32, 1993 NASCAR/WINSTON CUP YEAR-END REPORT, at 2-5
(1993) [hereinafter NASCAR/WINsTON CUP YEAR-END REPORT]; JOYCE JULIUS & ASSOCIATES, 8
SPONSORS REPORTNO. 12, 1993 IMSA CAMEL GT YEAR-END REPORT, at 2-4 (1993) [hereinafter IMSA
CAMEL GT YEAR-END REPORT]; JOYCE JULIUS & ASSOCIATES, 8 SPONSORS REPORT No. 20, 1993
NHRA/WINsTON DRAG RACING SERIES YEAR-END REPORT, at 4,6 (1993) [hereinafter NHRAIWINSTON
DRAG RACING SERIES YEAR-END REPORT].
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exposure time as that which "is realized when a sponsor's name or logo can
be readily identified by an unbiased observer., 35 Additionally, the firm's
statistics show that in the various major forms of racing discussed above,
tobacco company sponsors' "names, product(s), or clearly recognizable
slogan(s) ' 36 received televised mention no fewer than 3675 times during the
1993 season.37
For the beneficiaries of tobacco sports advertising, the fact that tobacco
company names and logos appear on television is incidental to the market
competition and bears no relation to the 1971 television ad ban. Roger Penske,
president of the Penske Racing IndyCar team, analogizes the competitive
nature of advertising to that of racing:
Barring or banning, in America, the free expression of someone you
disagree with is not consistent with my view of allowing someone to freely
and openly compete on their merits ... whether on the race track or in the
marketplace.
As long as cigarettes are a legal product, tobacco companies should
have every right to promote their products-right alongside sparkplugs and
motor oil-by sponsoring Indy race car drivers and teams. Selectively
banning the promotion of a particular product because some people do not
approve of that product would set a dangerous precedent.33
The tobacco industry denies that television coverage is the raison d'dtre for
its motorsports sponsorships, pointing instead to the demographics of the fans
who typically attend races.39 Nat Walker, public relations spokesman for R.J.
Reynolds, notes that "[p]eople who attend [motorsports] events have a higher
Sources of in-focus exposure include car identity, uniforms, helmets/hats, shirts, billboards, signs,
retaining walls, pit identification, starter's stand, television screen graphics, car transporters, flags,
banners, message boards, and scoreboards.
35. JoYce JuLIus & AssocIATEs, SPONSORS REPORT REFERNcE GUIDE (1993).
36. Id.
37. The Sponsors Report determines the value of a sponsor's television exposure by rating verbal
references at 10 seconds each. After the in-focus time and the verbal reference time are added together,
the dollar value received is calculated based upon the non-discounted cost of the individual broadcast's
advertising rate for a 30 second commercial.
By individual series, tobacco manufacturers received the following televised values: IndyCar-7 hirs.,
31 min., 21 sec. of in-focus exposure (5% over 1992), 98 sponsor mentions (32% under 1992), and
$18,523,225 in value (45% over 1992), INDYCAR YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 34, at 2, 4-6;
NASCAR-16 hrs., 5 min., 27 see. of in-focus exposure (14% over 1992), 1918 sponsor mentions (23%
under 1992), and $31,379,755 in value (96% over 1992), NASCAR/WINSTON CUP YEAR-END REPORT,
supra note 34, at 2-5; IMSA-3 hrs., 39 min., 57 sec. of in-focus exposure (33% over 1992), 689
sponsor mentions (23% under 1992), and $2,923,890 in value (10% under 1992), IMSA CAMEL GT
YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 34, at 2-4; NHRA-6 his., 27 min., 15 sec. of in-focus exposure, 970
sponsor mentions, and $4,639,220 in value (1992 figures not available), NHRA/WINsToN DRAG RACING
SERIES YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 34, at 4, 6.
38. Hearings on H.R. 5041, supra note 30, at 783 (statement of Roger S. Penske, president and
CEO, Penske Corporation; president and founder, Penske Racing, Inc.; director, Championship Auto
Racing Teams, Inc. ("CART')). It should be noted that at the time of his testimony before Congress,
Mr. Penske was a member of the board of directors of Philip Morris Companies, Inc., parent company
of CART sponsor Marlboro. PI.UP MORRIS COMPANIES, INC., SEC 10-K 5 (1989).
39. Skip Wollenberg, Tobacco Firms Woo Audience in Racing, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, May 28, 1994,
at BS.
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incidence of smoking than the general population."4 Similarly, Philip Morris
executive Ellen Merlo maintains that her company would be involved with
racing anyway, even if the sport were not televised at all.4 Notwithstanding
that those who attend racing events tend to fit the tobacco industry's target
market, it is a safe assumption that tobacco companies, when justifying
promotional expenditures, entertain the possibility that their brands will be
seen or mentioned on television.42
Despite findings by certain members of Congress that the tobacco industry
is unwilling to alter its marketing practices to minimize the impact on
minors,43 there are indications that tobacco companies are moving toward
self-regulation (or moderation) to protect their financial stake in motorsport
from government intervention. Philip Morris' recent agreement with the city
of New York to devote a substantial percentage of its billboard space to an
anti-smoking campaign for minors-in return for the right to sponsor the
stillborn Marlboro Grand Prix-would have been unthinkable five years
ago.44 Another example, though considerably less noteworthy, was R.J.
Reynolds' effort to deemphasize the Camel brand name in its NASCAR and
NHRA sponsorships in 1994 by switching to "Smokin' Joe's Racing Team"
labels and reducing the size of the Camel name.45
While members of the tobacco industry and the racing fraternity generally
agree that a ban on sports tobacco advertising would have some initial impact
on American motorsports, there is little consensus on the relative severity of
that impact. Hardy Smith, executive director of the National Motorsports
Council lobby organization, argues that "[c]ompetition would suffer, and races
might be moved from free TV to pay-per-view. '46 IndyCar President and
Chief Executive Officer Andrew Craig states that loss of tobacco sponsorship
money would be "extremely damaging" to racing.47 Others take a less
dramatic view of the potential impact on the sport. H. Kent "Bud" Stanner,
senior manager for the International Management Group ("IMG") and
promoter of the IndyCar races at Detroit and Cleveland, feels that motorsports
40. Id. at B12. Walker downplays the impact of tobacco logos on cars and trackside signs, saying,
"I would argue it has none. I don't believe it is advertising." Id.
41. Id. at B8.
42. Id.
43. H.R. 2147, supra note 5, § 2; H.R. 5041, supra note 15, § 2; see H.R. 3614, supra note 13, § 3.
44. See infra text accompanying notes 104-09.
45. Whalen, supra note 11, at 28.
46. Liz Clarke, Will Sponsorship Go up in Smoke?, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Aug. 4, 1994, at E26. The
National Motorsports Council was organized several years ago by the major sanctioning bodies to lobby
on issues which affect the racing community. The Council has adopted the position that the advertising
and marketing of a legal product such as tobacco should not be problematic. Raynal, supra note 18,
at 22.
47. Dick Rockne, Portland 200 Notebook-CART President Leery ofAdvertising Limits, SEATrLE
TIMEs, June 26, 1994, at D6; see also Clarke, supra note 46, at E26 ("'Your $100 ticket would become
a $300 ticket if tobacco companies didn't pay the tab.") (quoting Johnny Hayes, vice president for
motorsports for U.S. Tobacco); Oates, supra note 23 ("'A ban on [tobacco promoters] would do
significant damage to motor racing."') (quoting Bryan Tracy, vice president of the National Hot Rod
Association); Raynal, supra note 18, at 20 ("'The drivers, owners and promoters will be the people that
will lose the most."') (quoting Ellen Merlo, vice president of corporate affairs for Philip Morris).
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would survive just as it did in the 1970's, when the oil companies pulled out
of racing during the energy crisis. In Stanner's view, a ban on tobacco sports
promotion would simply mean that racers would have to work harder to find
other corporate sponsors. Stanner's viewpoint echoes that of Representative
Mike Synar, sponsor of the legislation which would bring tobacco under the
jurisdiction of the FDA.48 In Synar's opinion, any void created by the loss
of tobacco sponsorship money would be filled immediately by other
companies waiting for an opportunity to become involved in motorsports.
49
B. The Efficacy of Restriction
Congressional members who seek restriction of tobacco advertising believe
that the solution to the tobacco epidemic lies either in removal of commercial
information about tobacco products in situations which involve competing
messages (such as athletics and tobacco use)5 ° or in providing powerful
warning messages each time a decision is made about the use of tobacco. 5I
Congressional interest in the tobacco industry's sponsorship of sports, and of
motor racing in particular, derives from two premises: that, for adolescents,52
(1) the unregulated promotion of tobacco products circumvents federal health
warnings, rendering them essentially ineffective;53 and (2) the association of
tobacco with the image of sport is a substantial factor in the initiation or
continuation of tobacco use.54 Of course, the first premise is not dependent
upon the second: If the unregulated promotion of tobacco is sufficient,
through simple repetition, to evoke recall of a trademark logo or product name
at the time a person decides whether to use tobacco, the imagery of sport may
be irrelevant. But the validity of the second premise depends upon that of the
first. In order for it to be true that imagery is a substantial factor in the
decision to use tobacco, it must also be true that unrestricted tobacco
advertising in sport has the potential to overcome the impact of the package
warning label message.
The focus on attacking the tobacco problem at the level of adolescence
appears to be sound: A recent California study demonstrates that virtually all
new smokers come from the ranks of teenagers. 55 The only questions
remaining are whether such advertising restrictions are constitutionally
48. See discussion infra parts II.B, III.A.
49. Raynal, supra note 18, at 19.
50. H.R. 3614, supra note 13, § 6; H.R. 2147, supra note 5, § 5.
51. H.R. 3614, supra note 13, § 3.
52. See infra notes 135-40 and accompanying text; see also H.R. 2147, supra note 5, § 2 ("Each
day 3,000 children try cigarettes for the first time and many become life-long addicted smokers.").
53. H.R. 3614, supra note 13, § 3.
54. H.R. 5041, supra note 15, § 2.
55. Paul Raeburn, More Teens Starting to Smoke Cigarettes, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Dec. 3, 1993, at
D16. John Pierce, of the University of California at San Diego, reported the results of his study at a
scientific conference of the California Tobacco-Related Disease Research Program in San Francisco; see
also Karen Lewis, Addicting the Young: Tobacco Pushers and Kids, 13 MULTINAT'L MONITOR 13
(1992) ("Tobacco companies' survival depends on the successful recruitment of new smokers, the vast
majority of whom-approximately 90 percent in the United States-are children and teenagers-').
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permissible and whether they would be beneficial in reducing the tobacco
problem. According to the research data, teenage smoking had declined by
about one percent per annum through the 1980's until 1988.56 Since then,
however, the number of teenage smokers has begun to rise while the number
of "new" adult smokers has dropped dramatically, 57 a "surge" the researcher
attributes to the widely-criticized "Joe Camel" cigarette advertising cam-
paign.58 In an earlier study reported in the Journal of the American Medical
Association, research showed that during the first three years of R.J.
Reynolds' "Old Joe" advertising campaign, the proportion of adolescent
smokers choosing Camels rose from 0.5% to 32.8%. 59 Moreover, children
aged twelve through thirteen years registered the greatest recognition of
campaign material.6' Thus, Congress' attention to the problem of adolescent
smoking is warranted for two distinct reasons. Not only is there evidence to
show that the majority of smokers begin tobacco use as adolescents, but there
are also strong empirical data indicating that children of that age are
extremely impressionable with regard to tobacco advertising.
Studies of the effect of advertising and promotion of tobacco products
typically take one of two forms. A study may document total cigarette
consumption following enactment of specific legislative restrictions, or, as
with the study just discussed, the research may attempt to show product
trademark logo or name recognition among various groups. In general, neither
type of study has proved conclusive, probably because raw consumption data
or familiarity with product identification are overly simplistic methods of
analysis and tend to disregard too many other factors involved in the initiation
or continuation of tobacco use.6t
A recent British study of the effects of tobacco advertising bans around the
world shows no negative effect on consumption.62 In fact, the data suggest
that bans may have increased consumption. 63 Among the twenty-two
countries studied over a twenty-seven year period, six had passed legislation
banning all types of tobacco advertising by 1990.4 The six countries with
complete bans are: Iceland (1972), Norway (1976), Finland (1979), Portugal
(1984), Italy (1984), and Canada (1989).65 In Finland, for example, where
the ban went into effect during 1978, consumption rose seven percent over the
1977 figure between 1979 and 1989; similarly, Italy's 1983 ban had no readily
56. Raebum, supra note 55, at D16.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Joseph K. DiFranza et al., RJR Nabisco's Cartoon Camel Promotes Camel Cigarettes to
Children, 266 JAMA 3149, 3151 (1991).
60. John P. Pierce et al., Does Tobacco Advertising Target Young People to Start Smoking?, 266
JAMA 3154, 3157 (1991).
61. See Glen Smith, The Effect of Advertising on Juvenile Smoking Behaviour, 9 INT'L J.
ADVERTISING 57, 71-72 (1990); Michael J. Stewart, The Effect on Tobacco Consumption ofAdvertising
Bans in OECD Countries, 12 INT'L J. ADVERTISING 155, 158 (1993).
62. Stewart, supra note 61, at 168.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 155.
65. Id.
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apparent effect, with raw consumption increasing about four percent over the
1982 figure from 1984 through 1989.66 Only in Canada did consumption
drop below expectations.67
A Canadian investigation conducted by John Jenkins of the effects
advertising bans have on juvenile smoking supports Stewart's contention that
these bans may have the reverse effect to that intended:
The harmful effects of an advertising ban can be seen clearly in
Norway (with its absolute cigarette advertising ban) where the percentage
of smokers smoking high-tar cigarettes is much higher than in countries
such as the UK with only a partial ban. The same situation prevails in
Eastern European countries, such as the Soviet Union, which also have
complete advertising bans.6"
A study of juvenile smoking behavior completed shortly before Canada's
tobacco advertising ban went into effect69 concurs with the British study's
conclusion that bans have no negative effect on consumption. Unlike the
earlier mentioned research on the "Joe Camel" advertising campaign,70 the
Jenkins study found no evidence linking tobacco advertising with juvenile
smoking initiation.7' This study concludes that advertising encounters a
series of psychological barriers erected against such commercial messages:
Good advertising can overcome the psychological barriers that a
consumer erects, but only because consumers decide for themselves that the
advertisement or commercial in question provides valuable information
which will help them to make a sound product choice. These days, when
practically the entire population in many countries is aware of the tobacco-
health controversy, it is reasonable to assume that advertising by cigarette
manufacturers meets even more psychological obstacles than does
advertising by most other advertisers.72
Jenkins overlooks two important points in his conclusion, however. First, for
many legislators (and presumably many health professionals), the question is
not whether a commercial advertisement or promotion itself persuades the
consumer to smoke. Rather, the issue is whether a product name, a trademark
logo, or a slogan manifests itself to the person at the point when he or she
66. Id. at 158.
67. Id. at 159. The study's author notes, however, that the decrease in demand may be more
indicative of an eighteen percent increase in "real" price from the preceding year rather than any effects
from the advertising ban. Id.
While the author of the British study shows a 2% drop in total consumption at the conclusion of the
first full year of the ban, Kenneth Kyle, of the Canadian Cancer Society, claims that per capita
consumption in 1989 decreased by 7.8%, "the greatest decrease in the 1980's." Also, according to Kyle,
a comparison between the first five months of 1990 and the similar period in 1989 showed that total
consumption declined by 12.2%. Hearings on H.R. 5041, supra note 30, at 347-48 (statement of
Kenneth L. Kyle, national director of public issues, Canadian Cancer Society).
68. John Jenkins, Tobacco Advertising and Children: Some Canadian Findings, 7 INT'L J.
ADVERTISING 357, 365 (1988).
69. Id. at 359. As with House Bill 3614, one ofthejustifications for Canada's advertising legislation
is to decrease juvenile initiation. Id. at 362.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
71. Jenkins, supra note 68, at 364.
72. Id. at 358 (emphasis in original).
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makes a decision to use tobacco," regardless of what other factors may have
created the impulse. Second, implicit in Jenkins' statements is an assumption
that juveniles erect the same type of psychological obstacles as the population
at large. In reality, many juveniles, though perhaps aware of the "tobacco-
health controversy," may specifically avoid erecting those obstacles as part of
their own social code.
In 1987, Professor Jean J. Boddewyn testified before Congress on the
impact of tobacco advertising controls, documenting the results of two
international studies.7 4 The first study involved a sixteen-country study of the
effect of tobacco advertising restrictions or bans on per capita consumption
of tobacco. Professor Boddewyn found that "there is no conclusive evidence
that tobacco advertising bans are followed by significant changes in smoking
behavior."75 The second study, conducted by the London-based Children's
Research Unit, compared children's smoking initiation rates in four countries
with differing types of tobacco advertising controls.76 This study involved
the interviews of 1000 children between the ages of seven and fifteen in each
of the countries which had advertising regulations ranging from minor restric-
tions to a total ban.77 The study analyzed data from the following countries:
(1) Australia, with an electronic media ban similar to that of the United
Kingdom; (2) Norway, which enforces a total advertising ban; and (3) Spain
and Hong Kong, where all manner of tobacco advertising is permitted with
only minor restrictions." Juvenile smoking statistics from these countries
showed no correlation between smoking initiation and the degree of
advertising control.79 Thus, in Professor Boddewyn's opinion, "[c]learly
factors other than tobacco advertising and its regulation must have played a
key role in juvenile smoking initiation and incidence.""° Therefore, unlike
the 1991 study of R.J. Reynolds' "Old Joe" promotional campaign,8 ' which
demonstrates that existing adolescent smokers are very impressionable with
regard to tobacco advertising, Boddewyn's data show that tobacco promotion
has no effect on adolescents who do not currently use tobacco. 2
73. See supra text accompanying notes 50-54.
74. Hearings on H.R. 1272 and H.R. 1532, supra note 30, at 343-44 (statement of Jean J.
Boddewyn, professor of marketing and international business, Baruch College, City University of New
York).
75. Id. at 344 (emphasis in original).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 344, 346.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 346. The Children's Research Unit study ultimately expanded to include 15 countries.
Using a standard format of 1000 interviews per country, the study reached substantially the same
conclusion as Professor Boddewyn reported before Congress in 1987. Additionally, the study found that
"the major-indeed, the overwhelming-influence on smoking initiation among young people was
smoking by friends and family. The importance of this factor was very similar to all the countries
studied." Smith, supra note 61, at 57, 67.
80. Hearings on H.R. 1272 and H.R. 1532, supra note 30, at 346.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60.
82. In a critique of a New Zealand study, Michael J. Stewart points out:
Though not obvious at a casual reading, the finding that advertising restrictions reduce
consumption relies on the assumption that the intrinsic tobacco consumption is the same in all
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Notwithstanding Boddewyn's conclusions, there remains ample room for
speculation about the effect of tobacco advertising when associated with
televised sporting events. In the context of motor racing, tobacco advertising
restrictions potentially would have the greatest effect on adolescents through
the medium of television: A demographics study of one of America's most
popular racing series shows that less than two percent of the persons attending
an event are under eighteen years of age.83 Since adolescents have tradition-
ally accounted for a significant percentage of newsstand sales of racing
magazines, s presumably the low percentage of young persons attending
events reflects factors other than a lack of interest in the sport." Television
coverage of events is considerably more accessible to adolescents, a fact
which underlies congressional concern for the tobacco companies' alleged
circumvention of the 1971 tobacco advertising ban on television and radio.
Indeed, a 1984 British study found that tobacco company sponsorship of
sporting events acts as cigarette advertising to children.16 The survey tested
two groups of British schoolchildren8 7 in the weeks following a pair of
televised snooker championships," each of which was sponsored by a
different tobacco company. The first part of the study, conducted two to three
weeks after the Benson & Hedges Masters Snooker Championship, 9 asked
children who smoked to write the name of the brand or brands they preferred
to smoke. In response, the "great majority" of students listed Benson &
Hedges first, followed by John Player Special and Embassy, despite
countries. This assumption is so implausible that one only needs to understand that it has been
made to reject any analysis based on it.
Michael J. Stewart, Tobacco Consumption and Advertising Restrictions: A Critique of Laugesen and
Meads (1991), 11 INT'L J. ADVERTISING 97, 111 (1992).
If Stewart's statement is valid (and there is no reason to believe that it is not), it must also be true
that a finding that advertising restrictions do not reduce consumption is remiss in assuming that the
intrinsic tobacco consumption is the same in all countries. Boddewyn's Children's Research Unit study
did not involve research in the United States, where the saturation level of tobacco promotions may be
distinct.
83. Clarke, supra note 46, at E26. Another demographic study of NASCAR Winston Cup fans,
conducted by Nordhaus Research Co., shows that the average fan is a 36-year-old male with an annual
income of slightly less than $40,000. Vega, supra note 8, at 69.
84. Although adolescents are not well-represented in most demographic studies of racing magazine
readership, it is nonetheless logical to assume that a significantly higher percentage of adolescents read
racing magazines than attend racing events. This is so because most demographic surveys of racing
magazine readership track subscriber statistics rather than data pertaining to single-copy newsstand sales.
Adolescents, who tend to have considerably less discretionary income than do most adults, often
purchase single copies rather than subscriptions and are thus virtually invisible to demographic studies.
85. Factors affecting adolescents' low attendance rate at motorsports events may include: (a) cost
of admission; (b) age/inability to drive; and (c) availability of more accessible alternative activities.
86. Frank Ledwith, Does Tobacco Sports Sponsorship on Television Act as Advertising to
Children?, 43 HEALTH ED. J. 85 (1984).
87. The researcher notes that, due to the all-pervasive nature of tobacco promotions, it is impossible
to establish a baseline of children unexposed to tobacco sports sponsorship. Additionally, since the study
was intended to be nothing more than an initial step-proving that tobacco companies circumvent the
British television advertisement ban-no attempt was made to document a causal link between sports
sponsorship and smoking behavior. Id.
88. Snooker is a variation of pool played with 15 red balls and 6 variously colored balls.
,VEBSTER'S NmrrH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1116 (1991).
89. Ledwith, supra note 86, at 85. BBC TV carried 28 hours of coverage of the Championship. Id.
1994]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Embassy's relatively large market share and historically frequent sports
television exposure.9" The survey also asked children to link cigarette brand
names to the sports with which they normally are associated. Of the four
brands students listed, Benson & Hedges and John Player Special were most
prominent.9'
The second part of the study involved asking similar questions of a different
group of students92 shortly after the Embassy World Snooker Champion-
ship.93 While there was no increase in the number of children recalling the
Benson & Hedges brand name, the proportion of students associating the
Embassy brand name with sports more than doubled in the second survey. 94
Interestingly, the research data also showed a "very greatly increased"
awareness of the Marlboro and John Player Special brands and their
associations with sport.95 Ostensibly, this was due to the widely publicized
appearance of the Marlboro McLaren and John Player Special Lotus Formula
One cars on two televised Grand Prix events, as well as several other motor
racing "programmes," during the interim between the snooker champion-
ships.96
Neither brand recognition surveys nor studies of market-share increases97
demonstrate conclusively that tobacco sports advertisement and promotion
leads adolescents to begin or to continue smoking. But legislators who favor
advertising restriction contend that the association of tobacco products with
the image of sport may prove overly persuasive to the inexperienced or the
uninformed.98 Nongovernmental organizations also have expressed this
concern,99 most notably the Manhattan-based Smoke Free Educational
Services, a nonprofit advocacy group.'00 Smoke Free president Joe Cherner,
who seeks the removal of a Marlboro billboard at Shea Stadium,' 0' main-
tains that the billboard circumvents the television advertising ban and "teaches
90. Id. at 86. Researchers attributed Embassy's poor showing to a lack of recent sports sponsorship.
Id. at 87.
91. Id. at 86.
92. Id. at 87. Due to an "industrial action" and the unavailability of fifth year students, researchers
randomly selected the same number of classes with the condition that those involved in the first survey
could not participate in the second. Id.
93. Id. Television coverage of the Championship amounted to more than 100 hours. Id.
94. Id. The second survey took place approximately 10 to I 1 weeks after the first Id. at 85-87.
95. Id. at 87.
96. Id. at 88.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 62-82, 86-96.
98. H.R. 5041, supra note 15, § 2; see H.R. 3614, supra note 13, § 6; H.R. 2147, supra note 5,
§§ 2,5.
99. Testifying before Congress, Professor William Cahan stated:
Current Virginia Slims advertisements, combined with the Virginia Slims Tennis Tournament,
create exactly the wrong role model for our young teenage girls today. These ads and the
Virginia Slims sponsorship began just as the tobacco industry began to target women, and not
coincidentally, just as smoking rates among teenage girls began to skyrocket. These ads are not
about brand switching; they are designed to create role models for young teenagers deciding
whether or not to begin smoking. Unfortunately, experience teaches us that these efforts work.
Hearings on H.R. 5041, supra note 30, at 334 (statement of William G. Cahan, professor of surgery,
Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center).
100. James Bennet, Anti-Smoker Presses Shea Billboard Battle, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 26, 1993, at B3.
101. Id.
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children to link cigarettes to the ballplayers who play in front of it.' 0 2
Philip Morris spokesperson Karen Daragan claims that the advertising is there
"because a large number of adult smokers attend the games." Daragan insists
that "[t]elevision coverage is incidental."' °3
In 1992, Smoke Free Educational Services, together with the New York
Public Interest Research Group, filed suit to halt the Marlboro Grand Prix, a
through-the-streets IndyCar race'04 in Manhattan scheduled for the summer
of 1993.105 Despite Philip Morris' ten-year agreement to post anti-smoking
messages for minors on thirty percent of its New York billboards, Chemer's
group sued to prevent "mixing tobacco with sports."0 6 In October, 1992,
after several local organizations had termed the combination of tobacco
promotion and sports "unethical,"'10 7 Philip Morris backed out of the
sponsorship deal, citing "financial considerations."' 3 t At the same time,
officials at Philip Morris announced that the company still planned to sponsor
an anti-smoking billboard campaign for the benefit of minors." 9
Though Cherner's group and other tobacco sports advertising foes have no
doubt that motor racing is a sport, some persons may consider racing to be
less physically demanding than baseball or other "traditional" sports, and
therefore not subject to the conflicting images of athletics and tobacco
use."0 But racing, like other sports, is a physically demanding activity
which rewards top physical conditioning. Dr. Harlen Hunter, of the American
Osteopathic Board of Surgery, points out:
As for the physical demands of motorsports, research suggests that
driving a race car can be as strenuous as endurance sports such as distance
running and bicycling and can require more upper-body muscular stamina
than football....
Racing excels like no other activity at imposing life-threatening perils
of heat and dehydration upon participants . . .
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. The IndyCar series, which is owned and managed by Championship Auto Racing Teams, is a
16-race championship for cars of the type that run in the Indianapolis 500.
105. Lawsuit Fights Manhattan Race, N.Y. TIMEs, July 29, 1992, at BI5. The suit, filed against the
City of New York and its Department of Transportation, claimed that the city circumvented land-use
review procedure and failed to conduct a proper environmental impact study. Id.
106. Bruce Horovitz, Philip Morris Hits the Wall on N.Y. Street Auto Race, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17,
1992, at D2.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Additionally, some persons might argue that cigarette smoking is not, in fact, dissimilar from
the risk-taking behavior involved in racing. See Advertising of Tobacco Products: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. 275 (1986) (statement of Alan Blum, founder and chairman, Doctors Ought to Care); see also
Wollenberg, supra note 39, at B12 ("The thrill of danger in watching a car race makes smoking a
cigarette seem less dangerous.") (quoting marketing strategist Al Ries). But psychology professor Barry
Smith contends that while racing drivers are "sensation seekers," they also "tend to be very cautious,
checking and rechecking their equipment." Nancy Ross-Flanigan, Need to Speed: It's Not the
Competition, but the Risk, CH. TRIB., June 25, 1991, § 5, at 2.
111. HARLEN C. HUNTER & RICK STOFF, MOTORSPORTS MEDICiNE 2 (1992).
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Modem racing cars like those which had been scheduled to participate in the
Marlboro Grand Prix frequently develop in excess of three times the force of
gravity through the turns on a racetrack, causing the body of a 165-pound
driver to weigh the equivalent of more than 500 pounds. Researchers at
McGill University's Motor Sports Research Group in Montreal have measured
the cardiovascular performance of several drivers' hearts during races. Their
studies show that
at points during the races the drivers' heart rates are at absolute maximum,
and during significant extended periods their heart rates are near maximum.
Indeed, average heart rates of 170-180 beats per minute (80-85 percent of
maximum) were seen during the full period of a 2-hour race-which is in
the same order of magnitude as seen during a marathon!"'
Thus, because the physical demands on racing drivers are similar to those
found in any other sport, the conflicting images of athletics and tobacco use
found in baseball and other traditional sports are also present in motor racing.
Spokespersons for the tobacco industry insist that cigarette sponsorship of
(or association with) sporting events does not induce young people to believe
they can use tobacco without impairing their athletic abilities." 3 Moreover,
tobacco companies deny that they expect people to start smoking after
attending a tobacco-sponsored sporting event, claiming instead that they
promote the sport, not smoking."' Nat Walker, director of public relations
for R.J. Reynolds, says that Winston's investment in the NASCAR series
serves three functions: (1) it allows the company to reach a large number of
existing smokers, both loyal and competitive; (2) it provides a format in
which Winston can entertain customers and other guests; and (3) it facilitates
retail store promotions near the event sites." 5 According to some marketing
experts, the type of promotion tobacco companies use is common among
producers of a variety of goods, simply because the relationship develops
goodwill with the public while connecting the companies with an existing
market." 6 But the stated motives of the tobacco companies are irrelevant,
given the impact of their marketing strategies.
In 1986, Kenneth Warner published a monograph of various studies on the
effects of tobacco advertising and promotion. While the evidence yielded no
definitive answer regarding a direct relationship between advertising and
tobacco consumption, Warner stated that
112. Ted West, Fit to Win, ROAD & TRACK, June 1987, at 126, 128. Professors Jacques Dallaire and
Dan Marisi, the McGill University researchers who founded Motor Sport Research Group, currently
operate Human Performance International, a physiological and psychological evaluation facility in
Florida.
113. See Hearings on H.R. 5041, supra note 30, at 500 (statement of Charles 0. Whitley, senior
consultant, the Tobacco Institute).
114. Elizabeth Comte, Spenders Talking Via Sports, SPORTING NEWS, Mar. 19, 1990, at 46.
115. Nancy Ten Kate, Make It an Event, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Nov. 1992, at 40, 44.
116. Hearings on H.R. 5041, supra note 30, at 565 (statement of Richard W. Mizerski, professor of
marketing, Florida State University); see Richard Sandomir, Sports Officials Shrug Off Call for
Smokeless Sponsors, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1991, at BI 1 ('"We use our sponsorship to reach people who
have made an informed decision to smoke,' said Les Zuke, a spokesman for Philip Morris U.S.A. 'For
those who don't enjoy smoking, they can enjoy great tennis or auto racing.").
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[t]he history and function of advertising, both for products in general and
specifically for cigarettes, and the reality of the tobacco industry's behavior
combine to strongly suggest that the people who should know best-the
manufacturers and advertising experts-believe that advertising has
influenced and can continue to affect the level of cigarette consump-
tion.' 7
In conclusion, Warner noted that certainty is unnecessary for purposes of a
legislative ban, for "[i]f the causal relationship between advertising and
consumption were the issue, a legal or legislative judgment would be expected
to rest on presumption rather than irrefutable proof. In its entirety, the
evidence is sufficient to make a strong presumptive case that the causal
relationship exists."
118
II. PROPOSED FEDERAL REGULATION OF TOBACCO
ADVERTISING AND PROMOTION
Since 1986, members of Congress have sponsored various attempts to ban
or restrict advertising or promotion of tobacco products through sports.
Notwithstanding that the bills' sponsors have frequently accepted the need to
make concessions in the face of political reality, to date no tobacco adver-
tising scheme has gained sufficient support to become law. When the House
of Representatives adjourned from the second and final session of the 103d
Congress on October 7, 1994, no action had been taken on either of the then-
current pieces of legislation. One current bill would allow tobacco sports
promotion under certain conditions, but would require that a tobacco
manufacturer disseminate health information in relation to the manufacturer's
advertising. This bill is the lineal successor to earlier bills which attempted
to restrict tobacco promotion through the repeal and amendment of existing
tobacco regulations.
Another legislative proposal under consideration during the 103d Congress
would classify nicotine as a drug, bringing tobacco under the control of the
Food and Drug Administration and allowing the complete prohibition of
tobacco promotion in sporting events. This "FDA bill" approaches the tobacco
problem from a new direction, bypassing the previous route of attempting to
replace existing tobacco regulations. Finally, a proposed amendment to the
smokeless tobacco regulations would ban advertising or promotion of
smokeless tobacco products in connection with sporting events.
While both of the tobacco advertising bills under consideration by the
House died in committee at the conclusion of the 103d Congress, the sponsors
of those bills will likely introduce comparable legislation during the next
session of Congress. Therefore, this Note will examine the most recent
legislative schemes as examples of current efforts to control tobacco sports
advertising.
117. KENETH E. WARPmI SELLING SMOKE: CIGARETTE ADVERTISING AND PUBLIC HEALTH 70
(1986).
118. Id. at 102; see infra text accompanying note 182 (discussing Warner's review of the evidence).
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A. Initial Efforts to Restrict Advertising and Promotion
When Representative Mike Synar (D-OK) introduced the Health Protection
Act of 1986,119 he noted that its sponsors intended to keep the tobacco issue
"at the forefront of public discussion" until Congress eliminated the
"deceptiveness" of tobacco advertising.' After the House Committee on
Energy and Commerce failed to take action on either Synar's 1986 bill or the
similar Health Protection Act of 1987,121 Synar modified the legislation in
several key areas before reintroducing the bill as the Children's Health
Protection Act of 1989.122 In addition to the adoption of a paternalistic title,
the Act offered two attempts at compromise: (1) tobacco companies would be
allowed to sponsor events, vehicles, sports equipment, and toys "in the name
of a registered brand name, logo, or symbol" of a tobacco product, provided
that the registered brand name was also the name of the corporate manufac-
turer; and (2) print ads would be permitted so long as they utilized a black
print on white background format without pictures or graphics.2 2 Notwith-
standing these concessions to the tobacco lobby, House Bill 1493 failed to
pass in the Committee on Energy and Commerce.
In August of 1990, the House Subcommittee on Health and the Environ-
ment 2 4 considered another tobacco advertising and promotion bill, designated
the Tobacco Control and Health Protection Act.'25 Whereas the predecessor
bill, House Bill 1493, had allowed for some type of corporate tobacco
sponsorship, House Bill 5041 provided for a complete ban on corporate use
of tobacco product trademarks in the sponsorship of sports and entertainment
events. Like House Bill 1493, the Bill permitted print ads only in black on
white format. 126 When the tobacco lobby refused to accept any meaningful
controls over the advertising and marketing of tobacco products, the
Subcommittee approved an altered version of the Bill, eliminating the
advertising and promotion restrictions and retaining the provision for black
and white print ads. 7 This less restrictive version of House Bill 5041 died
when the House Committee on Energy and Commerce failed to take any
action on the Bill during the remainder of the 101st Congress.
119. H.R. 4972, supra note 14.
120. 132 CONG. REc. E2020 (daily ed. June 10, 1986) (extension of remarks of Rep. Mike Synar).
121. H.R. 1532, supra note 15. Introduced by Representative Bob Whittaker (R-KS), the bill
prohibited "[all] consumer sales promotion of tobacco products," id., § 3(a), including, inter alia,
"sponsorships of athletic, artistic, or other events under the registered brand name of a tobacco product."
Id. § 5(2)(D).
122. H.R. 1493, supra note 15.
123. Id. § 3(b)(2). The approved print ads were called "tombstone" ads.
124. The Subcommittee on Health and the Environment is a subcommittee of the House Committee
on Energy and Commerce.
125. H.R. 5041, supra note 15.
126. Id. § 6(a)(2).
127. Julie Rovner, House Subcommittee Approves Strong Antitobacco Measure, 48 CONG. Q. 2922
(1990). The second draft of House Bill 5041, submitted by Representative Bob Whittaker, attempted to
reconcile the Bill's provisions with the reality of the powerful tobacco lobby by eliminating the
advertising and promotion restrictions, which were said to be "by far the most contested portion of the
bill." Id.
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B. The Fairness in Tobacco and Nicotine Regulation Act of 1993
After a brief period of inactivity, proponents of advertising and promotion
restrictions approached the problem from a different angle. Whereas the
unsuccessful Tobacco Control and Health Protection Act 8 would have
independently repealed and replaced all existing tobacco regulations,'29 the
Fairness in Tobacco and Nicotine Regulation Act of 1993,30 introduced by
Representative Mike Synar, seeks to bring tobacco under the control of the
Food and Drug Administration.' Designated House Bill 2147, the Bill
would amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, and authorize the
Secretary to promulgate tobacco product regulations that control manufacture,
labeling, distribution, sale, promotion, and advertising.'
House Bill 2147 constitutes a major effort to rein in the tobacco industry
and control its traditional approach to marketing. By classifying nicotine as
a "drug," the Bill would allow the FDA to regulate tobacco promotion and
advertising, just as it currently does for other drugs. 33 The Act, as
amended, would prohibit the use of tobacco product trademarks in the
sponsorship of any sports, cultural, or other public event. 4 Representative
Synar, who considers himself a racing fan, has no qualms about removing
tobacco money from motorsports:
"My goal is to have race cars be free of any tobacco advertising by next
year's season-opener .... No deals, no warning labels. We want the
tobacco companies' names off race cars and race sponsorships. Tobacco
companies, through racing, ... and other sports, spend $4.5 billion
marketing to children .... Racing and race car drivers are seen by children
as glamorous and sexy. Children buy cigarettes because of this."' 135
128. H.R. 5041, supra note 15.
129. Id. § 16. Section 16 would have repealed both the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341) and the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education
Act (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4401-4408).
130. H.R. 2147, supra note 5.
131. Id. § 5. Sponsor Mike Synar failed to gain re-election in the November, 1994 congressional
race, having lost Oklahoma's Democratic primary on September 20, 1994. Synar's absence should not
affect reintroduction of the legislation, however, since House Bill 2147 had gained 53 cosponsors by
the conclusion of the 103d Congress.
132. Id. Section 2(4) of the Act notes that, despite well-documented evidence of the dangers of
tobacco use, no federal regulatory agency has authority over the manufacturing or marketing of tobacco
products.
133. Raynal, supra note 18, at 19.
134. H.R. 2147, supra note 5. Section 5(b)(3)(B) states:
In such regulations, the Secretary shall make it unlawful for any sporting event, cultural event,
or any other event or function open to the public to be sponsored by a tobacco manufacturer
who at such event or function displays the name or logo of any brand of cigarettes or tobacco
product of such manufacturer.
135. Raynal, supra note 18, at 19. Interestingly, even House Bill 2147's provisions, as written, would
not remove tobacco sports promotion and advertising from televisions in the United States. While
Synar's bill would regulate tobacco sponsorship at American sporting events, it would have no effect
on Formula One Grand Prix races broadcast into American homes from Europe, South America, and
Canada, where foreign subsidiaries of American tobacco companies display logos identical to those used
in the United States. Tobacco advertising in connection with sporting events is legal in 13 of the 16
countries where Formula One Grand Prix events are held, and even though Germany, France, and Great
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C. The Tobacco Education and Child Protection Act
House Bill 3614, entitled the Tobacco Education and Child Protection Act,
is the most recent congressional attempt to restrict the advertising and
promotion of tobacco through amendment of existing tobacco regulations.136
As the title indicates, the Bill is expressly directed toward providing accurate
information about tobacco use to adolescents. The title, along with the stated
purpose of the Bill, 37 represents a calculated change from the Bill's
immediate legislative predecessor, the Tobacco Control and Health Protection
Act. 38 While the previous version did evince concern for the influence of
tobacco advertising on children in its findings, 39 The sponsors of House
Bill 3614 ostensibly recognize that by focusing on children in the title and
purpose, the Bill's constitutionality is less likely to be attacked. With
protection of children's health as the stated purpose, it is presumptively easier
for the government to show both a substantial interest and direct advancement
of that interest. 40 Additionally, by expressly acknowledging paternalism
toward children, the Bill's sponsors may help to divert attention from its
paternalistic protection of adults.
Unlike the earlier House Bill 5041, which would have made it unlawful for
a tobacco company to engage in any advertising or promotional activity that
resulted in its product trademark appearing on sports facilities, on television,
or on vehicles or equipment used in sports,' 4' House Bill 3614 proposes
Britain have outlawed tobacco sports advertising, racing teams are allowed in those countries to simply
delete tobacco company lettering and retain company logos, such as the distinctive red Marlboro
chevron. See Oates, supra note 23, at C3.
136. H.R. 3614, supra note 13. Similar to its legislative predecessor, House Bill 5041, House Bill
3614 would repeal and replace existing tobacco regulations (though not as completely as would have
House Bill 5041). Introduced by Representative Henry A. Waxman (D-CA) on Nov. 22, 1993, the Bill
was referred to the Committee on Ehiergy and Commerce for further study.
137. Id. Section 2 states:
It is the purpose of this Act to assure that accurate information on the adverse health effects
of tobacco use are displayed on tobacco product packaging, advertising, and promotion in an
effective means that will assist-
(1) adolescents who are tempted to start using tobacco products,
(2) adolescents who are experimenting with tobacco and are not yet addicted to tobacco, and
(3) adults and adolescents who are considering quitting,
to reduce serious risks to their health.
138. H.R. 5041, supra note 15. An earlier version of the bill, H.R. 1493, supra note 15, was
designated the "Children's Health Protection Act of 1990."
139. H.R. 5041, supra note 15, § 2.
140. See infra text accompanying notes 208, 212.
141. H.R. 5041, supra note 15, § 6. In relevant part, the proposed provision read:
(a) ADVERTISING.-It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, package, or distribute
for sale within the United States any tobacco product except in accordance with the following
requirements:
(3) No tobacco product advertisement shall be located-
(A) in or on a sports stadium or other sports facility or any other facility where sporting
activity is regularly performed,
(B) on cars, boats, or other sporting equipment used in or associated with any sporting
event...
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markedly less restriction of tobacco company promotion through sponsorship
of sporting events. Under House Bill 3614, advertisements that include the
tobacco company's product trademark still would be prohibited from display
in or on sports facilities.'42 With regard to sports promotion, however, the
current Bill would permit a tobacco company to exhibit its product trademark
through the sponsorship of events or vehicles and equipment used in sporting
events, provided that the company simultaneously disseminates proportional
health information and complies with warning label requirements for sports
equipment.
143
The existence of House Bill 3614 is evidence that complete prohibition of
tobacco advertising, such as that proposed in House Bill 5041, is unlikely to
gain a majority in the House. It is relevant here, however, to consider the
(b) PROMOTION.-It shall be unlawful within the United States for the manufacturer, packager,
or distributor of tobacco products-
(4) to pay or cause to be paid to have... any tobacco product trademark appear in any
... television show.., or other form of entertainment, or
(5) to pay or cause to be paid to have any tobacco product trademark appear on any
vehicle, boat, or other equipment used in sports.
142. H.R. 3614, supra note 13, § 6. In relevant part, the current legislation provides:
(a) ADvERTISING.-It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, package, or distribute
for sale within the United States any tobacco product unless the advertising for such tobacco
product conforms with the following requirements:
(1) AUDIO TAPE, AUDIO DISCS, VIDEOTAPE, AND FILM.-No tobacco product may be
advertised on any audio tape, audio disc, videotape, video arcade game, or film.
(2) LOCATION.-No tobacco product advertisement shall be located-
(A) in or on a sports stadium or other sports facility or any other facility where sporting
activity is performed ....
(b) PROMOTION.-It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, package, or distribute
for sale within the United States any tobacco product unless the promotion for such tobacco
product conforms with the following requirements:
(3) SPONSORSHIP.-No athletic ... or other event may be sponsored or caused to be
sponsored in the name of a tobacco product trademark or in a manner so that a tobacco
product trademark is publicly identified as a sponsor of, or in any way associated with,
such an event unless the Secretary has approved a plan for the simultaneous dissemination
of health information at such event in the same proportion or prominence as the sponsor
has sponsored such event.
(4) APPEARANCE wITH ENTERTAINENT.-To pay or cause to be paid to have.., any
tobacco product trademark appear in any ... television show ... or other form of
entertainment.
(5) SPORTS EQUIPMENT.-No tobacco product trademark may appear on any vehicle, boat,
or other equipment or clothing used in sports unless such equipment or clothing displays
a health warning pursuant to regulations of the Secretary which assure prominence
equivalent to that required by Section 5(B)(1) [dealing with precise specifications for the
warning label].
Since subsection (4), unlike subsections (3) and (5), provides no alternative with which a company may
comply, it is unclear how a tobacco company could place its trademark on racing cars, for example,
without that trademark appearing on television or in front of fans attending the event. Racing can easily
be categorized as a form of "entertainment."
143. Id. But House Bill 3614 would apply only to persons manufacturing, packaging, or distributing
tobacco products within the United States. Therefore, the counterspeech provisions for warning labels
and dissemination of health information would not apply to motorsports coverage broadcast into
American homes from European, South American, and Canadian race tracks. See supra note 135.
1994]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
political landscape, which recently has shifted and promises to continue to
change. There has been a tremendous turnover in the membership of
Congress, and the collateral effects of the proposed Clinton health care reform
program may also affect the attractiveness of the various proposals. Under the
right political conditions, future legislation may reflect the more restrictive
provisions of earlier bills. As evidenced by the tobacco advertising
legislation's resilience to date, the failure of Congress to enact either of the
current bills is not likely to cause the legislation to disappear.
D. Proposed Amendment of the Smokeless Tobacco Regulations
On November 4, 1993, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") issued a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking which would require racing cars sponsored
by smokeless tobacco manufacturers to carry the same health warning labels
currently mandated for smokeless tobacco packages.'" This rulemaking
would amend the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act
of 1986 '4 to expressly provide that racing cars and other event-related
objects are advertising within the meaning of the Act. 4 6
Unlike cigarette advertising, which is subject to the jurisdiction of the
Department of Justice, smokeless tobacco advertising is under the authority
of the FTC. 47 In its 1987 regulations, the FTC granted an exemption for
"utilitarian" items such as caps, jackets, and T-shirts, but following a
challenge to the exemption, a federal court ordered the FTC to withdraw the
exemption. 48 In 1991, the FTC issued a final rule amending existing
regulations to revoke the exemption for utilitarian personal use items and to
provide for the display and rotation of health warnings thereon.'49 The
Commission declined to include sponsored racing cars in the definition of
utilitarian items at that time despite the urging of several groups.5 The
current proposed rulemaking is the result of a 1991 petition by the Coalition
144. 58 Fed. Reg. 58,810 (1993) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 307) (proposed Nov. 4, 1993). The
FTC subsequently extended the comment period for sixty days. 58 Fed. Reg. 64,388 (1993). As of this
writing, the proposed rules had yet to be adopted.
145. 16 C.F.R. § 307 (1994) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4401-4408).
146. Section 307.3 is amended by adding paragraphs (o) and (p) as follows:
§ 307.3-Terms defined.
(o) Sponsored racing vehicles and other event-related objects means racing vehicles and other
event-related objects (including but not limited to banners; flags; balloons; signs; safety
devices; uniforms; costumes; vehicles; concession stands; stage backdrops; clothes and props;
tickets) that display the brand name, logo, or selling message of any smokeless tobacco
product.
(p) Event means any type of gathering for public entertainment with or without an audience,
including, but not limited to, any athletic or sporting activity (such as tractor pulls and monster
truck events, racing, rodeo, wrestling or fishing) or musical, artistic, or nightclub activity.
147. 15 U.S.C. § 4402(f).
148. Public Citizen v. FTC, 869 F.2d 1541 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
149. 58 Fed. Reg. 58,810, at 58,811 (discussing Comm'n Pub. Docket No. 215-72).
150. 56 Fed. Reg. 11,653, at 11,654 (1991) ("[T]he question of whether racing cars are required to
carry warnings and, if so, the size and location of that warning must be answered under the existing
statute and regulation.").
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on Smoking OR Health, a group whose members include the American Heart
Association, the American Lung Association, and the American Cancer
Society.'
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TOBACCO
ADVERTISING REGULATION
Governmental regulation of tobacco sports advertising and promotion must
not run afoul of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 152 While
tobacco manufacturers assert a First Amendment right to advertise and
promote their products in a free market economy, clearly, in light of the
electronic media ban, that right is not absolute."' Since any case brought
under the proposed legislation would involve the restriction of advertising, the
analysis would be governed by existing commercial speech doctrine. Until
very recently, purely commercial advertising was not thought to enjoy any
protection under the Constitution. 54 Then, in 1976, the United States
Supreme Court held that speech did not lose its First Amendment protection
simply because the speaker's motives were purely economic ones, 55 but
cautioned that "[s]ome forms of commercial speech regulation are surely
permissible."'' 5 6 Thus, the Court gave commercial speech, defined as "speech
which does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction,," semi-protected
status as lower value speech.'5 7
151. 58 Fed. Reg. 58,810, at 58,811. Shortly after the FTC received the Coalition's petition, the
agency charged the Pinkerton Tobacco Company with violating the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco
Health Education Act for its practice of sponsoring televised sporting events such as "truck and tractor
events." After Pinkerton executed a consent order and admission, the FTC issued a cease and desist
order. 57 Fed. Reg. 4634 (1992).
Unlike the Federal Trade Commission, to date the Justice Department has pursued no actions against
cigarette advertising that appears on television allegedly in violation of the Public Health Cigarette
Smoking Act of 1969, despite receiving complaints from at least one organization. Roberts, supra note
28, at Al (noting that Dr. Alan Blum of Doctors Ought to Care claims he has contacted the Justice
Department in this regard).
152. The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
153. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
154. Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52
(1942).
155. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762
(1976) (overturning a state law that forbade advertising prescription drug prices).
156. Id. at 770. While the First Amendment precludes content-based regulation in most contexts, two
aspects of commercial speech permit regulation of content. First, due to the relationship of advertising
and pecuniary well-being, commercial speech is thought to be "hardier" than other speech. Additionally,
advertisers are presumed either to have considerable knowledge about the product or service being
offered or to be more readily able to determine the truthfulness of the speech. Bates v. State Bar, 433
U.S. 350, 381 (1977).
157. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n,
413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
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The idea that some types of speech merit less constitutional protection than
others traces its origins to the 1942 case of Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire,58 where the Supreme Court noted in dictum that there are
certain categories of speech which are not essential to the exposition of ideas
and which have limited social value. 59 In Chaplinsky, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of a conviction under a statute that prohibited addressing a
person in an offensive manner. In reaching its decision, the Court focused not
only on the value of the speech involved, but on the potential for immediate
harm resulting from the speech-the "fighting words" doctrine. °6 0 By
contrast, the modern theory of low-value speech categorizes speech-such as
commercial speech-by type, without regard to the Chaplinsky calculus of
balancing the benefit of the speech against the social interest in proscribing
it. In essence, then, the theory of low-value speech, under the guise of the
commercial speech doctrine, relegates tobacco sports advertising and
promotion to an intermediate level of scrutiny based solely upon the merit of
the type of speech involved.
For many constitutional scholars, this approach calls into question the basic
validity of the theory-the First Amendment protects a category of expression
called "speech," but the text of the Amendment itself recognizes no
subcategories of speech. 61 While it is reasonable to assume that the
Founding Fathers did not intend the First Amendment to shield speech which
inflicts injury or is calculated to incite immediate breaches of the peace, it is
less clear that the Amendment was drafted to allow courts to weigh the value
of certain categories of speech absent the immediacy found in Chaplinsky.'6 2
In the case of tobacco sports advertising and promotion, the speech itself does
not trigger the expected harm in the immediate sense of the "fighting words"
doctrine; rather, the advertising and promotion are only indirectly related to
the interest of the government in preventing illness and disease. Notwith-
standing the potential incompatibility of the modern theory of low-value
158. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
159. Id. at 571-72.
160. Specifically, the Court noted:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These
include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting"
words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach
of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.
Id. (citations omitted).
161. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 761 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting); STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FiRST
AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 44 (1990); Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central
Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 20, 31-32 (1975). But see R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2551-54 (1992) (White, J., concurring); Frederick Schauer, Categories and the
First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 271-72 (1981); Geoffrey R. Stone,
Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 189, 197 n.24 (1983); Cass
R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CH. L. REv. 255, 303-04 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography
and the First Amendment, 1986 DuKE L.J. 589, 605.
162. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 326 (1970).
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speech with the principles of the First Amendment, it is beyond the scope of
this Note to argue for a wholesale revision of the theory of low-value speech
in the context of the commercial speech doctrine.
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commis-
sion of New York, the Supreme Court announced a four-part test for
examining government restrictions on commercial speech. 63 First, for
commercial speech to receive First Amendment protection, the speech must
concern activity that is lawful and it must not be misleading.' 6 Next, the
government must affirmatively prove that it has a substantial interest in
regulating the speech.'65 Third, the restriction imposed upon the commercial
speaker must directly advance the asserted governmental interest. 6 6 Finally,
if a lesser restriction could serve the governmental interest equally well, a
court must find that the regulation excessively burdens the commercial
speech.
6 7
Since the provisions of the two most recent congressional bills would
impose markedly different restrictions on tobacco sponsorship and promotion,
this Note will consider each separately as current examples of a de facto
prohibition and a less restrictive alternative.
A. House Bill 2147
The Fairness in Tobacco and Nicotine Regulation Act of 1993 proposes to
bring tobacco regulation under the authority of the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration.' 8 In an effort to eliminate the association of tobacco products with the
image of a healthy lifestyle, one of the Bill's provisions would prohibit
tobacco companies from displaying the names of their tobacco products or
logos as part of their sponsorship of sporting events. 69 A corporate manu-
facturer still could promote an event in its own name absent any mention of
a tobacco product or its logo.
Applying the first prong of the Central Hudson test, one must determine
whether the prohibited speech merits First Amendment protection. Since
tobacco advertising and promotion involve the sale, purchase, and consump-
tion of tobacco products, all of which are legally permissible acts, the first
portion of part one is satisfied. Next, the speech must not be misleading. The
Supreme Court offered little guidance in Central Hudson as to which types of
163. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-64 (1980). The
Court defined commercial speech somewhat more broadly in Central Hudson than it had done
previously, describing it as "expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its
audience." Id. at 561.
164. Id. at 563-64.
165. Id. at 564.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 134. Additionally, the Bill would require advertising and promotion of tobacco
products to be "consistent with regulations governing the advertising and promotion of prescription
drugs, especially such drugs which contain nicotine." H.R. 2147, supra note 5, § 5(b)(3)(A).
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speech are misleading, stating simply that commercial speech "more likely to
deceive the public than to inform it" could be proscribed.7 0 In the case of
tobacco advertising, there is an ongoing dispute over whether the techniques
and themes tobacco companies use constitute deceptive practices.' 7' While
one could make the case that tobacco advertising is per se misleading when
displayed without proper warnings, particularly in the presence of children at
sponsored sporting events or in association with sports equipment, it is
unlikely that most courts would find that it lacks First Amendment protection
on that basis alone. 72
The second prong of the four-part Central Hudson analysis requires the
government to show a substantial interest in restricting the speech. Since
House Bill 2147 does not provide a statement of purpose like that of its
companion, the Tobacco Education and Child Protection Act (House Bill
3614),173 one must infer the purpose (or governmental interest) from the
text. Among its findings, the Bill notes the high health care and mortality
costs attributable to cigarette smoking and tobacco use, while calling attention
to the rate at which children begin smoking each day. 74 Peculiar to the
sponsorship section of the Bill is a reference to the tobacco industry's annual
promotional expenditures of $4 billion, along with an indictment of the
industry for failing to abide by its own voluntary code, "which was enacted
to prohibit the use of images of ... athletic abilities.' 7 5
Assuming that the governmental interest lies in the health and well-being
of both children and adults, there is little problem in finding that the interest
is substantial. Discussing the four-part test in Central Hudson relative to the
earlier Virginia Pharmacy decision, Justice Blackmun noted that "preventing
low quality health care" is certainly a "'substantial,' legitimate, and
important [government interest]." 76 Other governmental interests the Court
recently has found to be substantial include maintaining the safety and
170. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563.
171. In a 1988 law review article, Kenneth Polin argued that all tobacco promotion is misleading
because 'its purpose is to induce people to buy a product that is both harmful and addictive."' Polin,
supra note 2, at 113 (quoting Oklahoma Broadcasters Ass'n v. Crisp, 636 F. Supp. 978, 991 (W.D.
Okla. 1985)). Polin also noted that, under FTC standards, "[i]t is sufficient that... the advertisement
has the tendency to deceive." Id. at 114 (emphasis added).
172. The Tenth Circuit found, for example, that "[the Supreme Court's concern with 'inherently
misleading' advertising is directed towards advertising methods which tend to encourage fraud,
overreaching, or confusion, such as some forms of lawyer solicitation." Oklahoma Telecasters Ass'n v.
Crisp, 699 F.2d 490, 500 n.9 (10th Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 467 U.S. 691 (1984); see
generally Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (holding that the state bar could
constitutionally discipline a lawyer for in-person solicitation under circumstances liable to pose dangers
a state is entitled to prevent).
173. See supra note 13.
174. Id. § 2.
175. Id. § 2(6), (7).
176. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 576 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See also Posadas de Puerto Rico
Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986) ("We have no difficulty in concluding that the Puerto
Rico Legislature's interest in the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens constitutes a 'substantial'
governmental interest."); Banzhafv. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ("[S]ince it is so much
harder to stop [smoking] than not to start, it is crucial that an accurate picture be communicated to those
who have not yet begun."), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
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esthetics of a city,' 77 assuring the accuracy of commercial information in the
marketplace, 78  and supporting adjacent states' conflicting lottery poli-
cies. 179 In comparison, there can be no doubt that reducing an annual
mortality rate of 450,000, lost productivity and health care costs of $65 billion
per year, and the potential for life-long addiction of 3000 children each day
constitute substantial government interests. 80
The third Central Hudson factor requires a showing that the regulation
directly advances the governmental interest. As the studies in Part I show,
there is no clear answer whether the advertising or promotion of cigarettes or
other tobacco products has a significant impact on the rate at which people
initiate tobacco use. 8' In 1989, the Surgeon General addressed the issue:
There is no scientifically rigorous study available to the public that
provides a definitive answer to the basic question of whether advertising
and promotion increase the level of tobacco consumption. Given the
complexity of the issue, none is likely to be forthcoming in the foreseeable
future. The most comprehensive review of both the direct and indirect
mechanisms concluded that the collective empirical, experiential, and
logical evidence makes it more likely than not that advertising and
promotional activities do stimulate cigarette consumption. However, that
analysis also concluded that the extent of influence of advertising and
promotion on the level of consumption is unknown and possibly
unknowable."8 2
While the Central Hudson majority concluded that a restriction on commercial
speech violates the First Amendment "if it provides only ineffective or remote
support for the government's purpose,"' 3 its determination left open the
question of how one defines "ineffective" and "remote." In the absence of
empirical data in Central Hudson, the Court went on to find an "immediate
connection" between the plaintiff's promotional advertising and demand
177. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1509-10 (1993).
178. Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1799 (1993).
179. United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696, 2703 (1993).
180. H.R. 2147, supra note 5, § 2(8). Based on tobacco's effects on American society, the practices
of smoking and using smokeless tobacco probably fall into a category called "vices." Following the
Edge Broadcasting majority's passing reference to "vices" which "implicated no constitutionally
protected right," 113 S. Ct. at 2703, Justice Stevens argued in dissent that simply because lotteries
traditionally have been considered a vice is insufficient reason to find a substantial government interest.
In Stevens' opinion, because "hostility to state-ran lotteries is the exception rather than the norm" in
present-day society, neither the federal government nor the states have a "'substantial' interest in seeking
to discourage what virtually the entire country is embracing." Id. at 2710-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Employing Stevens' logic, it would seem to follow that the anti-smoking laws sweeping the country
today-prohibiting smoking in airplanes as well as in public and private buildings-together with the
overwhelming scientific evidence that pours in annually, argue forcefully that Congress has a substantial
interest in eradicating the harms tobacco causes.
181. See supra part I.B.
182. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, REDUCING THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES
OF SMOKING: 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS; A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, 516-17 (1989) (DHHS
Pub. No. CDC 89-8411 (1989)) (emphasis added) [hereinafter HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING].
183. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
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simply because "Central Hudson would not contest the advertising ban unless
it believed that promotion would increase its sales." 84
After a period in which the Supreme Court seemed to defer exclusively to
the legislative branch when applying Central Hudson's third criterion,"
recent commercial speech cases shed some light on the question of what the
government must affirmatively prove. Writing for the majority in Edenfield
v. Fane, Justice Kennedy concluded that a court cannot uphold a restriction
of commercial speech based on "mere speculation or conjecture" of advancing
the asserted interest. 86 Rather, the governmental body "must demonstrate
... that its restriction will in fact alleviate [the harms which created the
governmental interest] to a material degree."8 7 In Edenfield, the state of
Florida failed to carry its burden on Central Hudson 's third prong since it
offered no proof that a state ban on CPA solicitation advanced its interests in
"maintaining CPA independence and ensuring against conflicts of inter-
est." 18
8
Another commercial speech decision handed down two months after
Edenfield offers some tangible figures which can be employed to demonstrate
direct advancement of governmental interest. In the case of United States v.
Edge Broadcasting Co., a North Carolina-licensed radio station sought a
declaratory judgment, claiming that a federal statute violated the First
Amendment by prohibiting the station from airing advertisements for the
lottery in neighboring Virginia. 89 The Court found that by removing
gambling advertisements from eleven percent of a nine-county area's radio
listening time, Congress' policy of balancing between the interests of states
which approve lotteries and those which do not directly advanced the statutory
purpose of supporting North Carolina's antigambling policy. 9 By way of
184. Id. at 569. Justice Blackmun, writing separately, noted that the majority's discovery of a "direct
link" paved the way for the State to "suppress advertising of electricity in order to lessen demand for
electricity." Id. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
185. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 341-42 (1986) (finding
reasonable the Puerto Rico Legislature's belief that unregulated advertising of casino gambling would
serve to increase the demand for gambling among Puerto Rico residents); see also Metromedia, Inc. v.
City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 509 (1981) ("We likewise hesitate to disagree with the accumulated,
commonsense judgments of local lawmakers... that billboards are real and substantial hazards to traffic
safety.').
186. Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1800.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2702. In Edge Broadcasting, the plaintiff alleged that 18
U.S.C. §§ 1304 and 1307, which prohibit electronic media broadcasting of lottery information in non-
lottery states, violated both the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 2701-02.
190. Notwithstanding that North Carolina residents listen to Virginia-licensed stations where lottery
advertising is legal, the Court found unpersuasive the lower courts' judgments that lottery material was
"sufficiently pervasive" to render the restriction on Edge Broadcasting "ineffective." The Court
determined that the consequent decrease from 49% to 38% in listening time during which such messages
aired in the nine-county area would not be "without significance" under Central Hudson. Id at 2706.
In the context of future commercial speech cases and the application of Central Hudson's third prong,
it is important to make two observations about the Edge Broadcasting holding. First, the section of
Justice White's opinion that found the 11% reduction to be significant retained the approval of only five
Justices, including Justice White. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Thomas, Kennedy, and Souter
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comparison, an earlier decision in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,
Inc. held that removal of sixty-two newsracks out of a total of 1500-2000 did
not establish a reasonable "fit" between the city's interests in safety and
esthetics and its restriction of commercial speech, which was based on a
distinction between types of newspapers.' 9'
More important than numerical percentages for purposes of assessing the
constitutionality of tobacco sponsorship restriction is the Edge Broadcasting
majority's view of Central Hudson's third prong. Since no current tobacco
study can demonstrate an 11% success rate (in discouraging initiation or
continuation) as a result of removing product names and logos from sporting
events, the Court's comments elsewhere in the Edge Broadcasting opinion are
particularly revealing:
Congress has, for example, altogether banned the broadcast advertising of
cigarettes, even though it could hardly have believed that this regulation
would keep the public wholly ignorant of the availability of cigarettes....
Nor do we require that the Government make progress on every front
before it can make progress on any front. If there is an immediate
connection between advertising and demand, and the federal regulation
decreases advertising, it stands to reason that the policy of decreasing
demand ... is correspondingly advanced. 9 '
Though Edge Broadcasting appears to be somewhat deferential to Congress,
in no way does the Court's application of the Central Hudson criterion
approach the overall deference shown in Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates
v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico; 93 there, the Court not only deferred to the
legislature's belief that the prohibition would advance its interest, but made
no inquiry whatsoever into less restrictive alternatives, preferring to leave that
judgment to the legislature as well.'94 In Edge Broadcasting, while introduc-
ing a quantifiable figure (in the context of evaluating the direct advancement
of the government's interest) to give meaning to the terms "ineffective" and
"remote," the Court remained true to Central Hudson's original language of
an "immediate connection" between the end sought and the means chosen.'95
Although it may be unknowable what percentage of adolescents or adults
would avoid tobacco use as a result of House Bill 2147's de facto prohibition
of tobacco sponsorship at sporting events, it is obvious that the potential for
exposure to unregulated tobacco promotion is large. Unlike the Discovery
Network case, where the percentage of newsracks affected by the city
ordinance was insignificant relative to the discriminatory effect of the speech
joined Justice White, while Justices O'Connor and Scalia departed at this point in the opinion. Second,
with White's departure, there is general agreement that his successor, Justice Ginsburg, strongly favors
commercial speech. See Steven W. Colford, High Court Hopeful Seen as Ad Ally, ADVERTISiNG AGE,
June 21, 1993, at 48; see generally Claudia MacLachlan, Ad Limits Get Harder to Enact, NAT'L L.J.,
July 26, 1993, at 1.
191. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1510. The reduction in the number of newsracks amounted
to approximately three to four percent of the total.
192. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2707.
193. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
194. Id. at 344.
195. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2707.
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restriction, the magnitude of tobacco's involvement in racing is substantial in
comparison to the effect of the proposed restriction. Additionally, television
viewership of motorsports is likely to include a large percentage of young
people. Children-particularly adolescents-idolize racing drivers, and it is
likely that a number of the uninformed and impressionable among them will
presume that the exciting life of a four-time Indianapolis 500 winner includes
Marlboro cigarettes. 96 When tobacco's massive involvement in racing is
considered along with the aspirations of children who want to be like their
sports heroes, prohibition of tobacco sports promotion has the potential to
markedly advance the government's interest within the meaning of Edge
Broadcasting. Therefore, House Bill 2147's provisions pass Central Hudson 's
third requirement.
Turning to Central Hudson's final prong, it is necessary to determine
whether a lesser restriction on the tobacco companies' speech could serve the
government's substantial interest equally well. In essence, the degree to which
the government interferes with commercial speech must be proportional to the
interest involved. 97 The Supreme Court frequently has noted that the
application of Central Hudson's third and fourth prongs requires a "fit"
between the restriction and the government interest that is functionally the
same as the narrow-tailoring requirement of time, place, and manner
restrictions on fully-protected speech: a fit that is not perfect, but "reason-
able."' t In Central Hudson, for example, the Supreme Court rejected the
State's regulation of electric utility promotional advertising, finding that the
State's interest in conservation could not justify the suppression of informa-
tion. In the Court's view, situations existed where a utility's promotional
advertising presented no danger to the State's interest in conservation or its
concern that the public not be misled.' 99 The majority concluded by noting
that "[i]n the absence of a showing that more limited speech regulation would
be ineffective, we cannot approve the complete suppression of Central
Hudson's advertising. 20 0
The original language of Central Hudson's fourth prong stated that "if the
governmental interest could be served as well by a more limited restriction on
196. Racing drivers such as Rick Mears (now retired) who drive tobacco-sponsored cars typically
"lace" their speech with references to the sponsor when discussing the car or the team, just as other
drivers include the name of a motor oil or pizza sponsor when talking to the media. What often is not
apparent to the young, however, is that most racing drivers who are contractually bound to mention
tobacco product names believe that tobacco use is very unhealthy. Alan Truex, Health Car Races
Against Tobacco, Hous. CHRON., May 23, 1992, at I IB; see also Oates, supra note 23, at C9.
197. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982); Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
198. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2705; Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1798 (1993); City
of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1510 n.12 (1993); Board of Trustees v. Fox,
492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
199. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 570. The Court noted, for example, that "[tihe Commission's order
prevents [Central Hudson] from promoting electric services that would reduce energy use by diverting
demand from less efficient sources, or that would consume roughly the same amount of energy as do
alternative sources." Id.
200. Id. at 571.
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commercial speech, the excessive restrictions cannot survive. '20 1 In
subsequent commercial speech cases, the Court tended to replace the implicit
requirement of an inquiry into a less restrictive alternative with a technique
of simply examining the burden on its face.20 2 But in Discovery Network,
Justice Stevens resurrected the concept:
A regulation need not be "absolutely the least severe that will achieve the
desired end," but if there are numerous and obvious less-burdensome
alternatives to the restriction on commercial speech, that is certainly a
relevant consideration in determining whether the "fit" between ends and
means is reasonable.
20 3
In Edge Broadcasting, Justice White, writing for the Court, held that the
validity of a speech restriction must be judged "by the relation it bears to the
general problem. '20 4 In its simplest terms, then, Central Hudson's fourth
prong requires that the degree to which the government regulation restricts
commercial speech be proportional to the interest involved.
The restriction in House Bill 2147's tobacco sponsorship provision is not
a complete ban, but a prohibition in one selected area of the tobacco
industry's current advertising and promotional program.0 5 Unlike the earlier
bills, which would have banned all advertising and promotion (including
magazines, newspapers, and billboards) in every aspect of daily life,2 6 the
provisions of House Bill 2147 leave open many avenues of expression.2 7
Based on the presumed governmental interests in the health of children and
adults, and the dissociation of tobacco and sports,208 the percentage of
commercial speech that House Bill 2147 suppresses seems reasonable in
relation to the general problem, particularly when one considers that
enactment would remove tobacco promotion from one arena where its
presence has relatively great potential for causing harm.
Whether any less restrictive alternative would achieve as much as would the
removal of tobacco names and logos from sports such as racing is a matter of
conjecture. 20 9 But under the meaning of Edge Broadcasting, it is likely that
the requirement of narrow tailoring would be met because the sponsorship
201. Id. at 564. This language is virtually identical to that used in cases which deal with time, place,
and manner restrictions. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) ("[T]he
requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied 'so long as the ... regulation promotes a substantial
government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation."') (omission in
original) (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
202. See Fox, 492 U.S. at 480 ("Within those bounds we leave it to governmental decisionmakers
to judge what manner of regulation may best be employed."); Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v.
Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 344 (1986) ("We think it is up to the legislature to decide .... ');
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 508 (1981) ("If the city has a sufficient basis for
believing that billboards are traffic hazards... then ... perhaps the only effective approach... is to
prohibit them.').
203. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1510 n.13 (quoting Fox, 492 U.S. at 480).
204. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2705.
205. See supra text accompanying note 169.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 14 and 15.
207. H.R. 2147, supra note 5, § 5.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 174-75.
209. See supra text accompanying note 182.
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provision does not "burden substantially more speech than necessary to further
the government's legitimate interests."21 Therefore, the Bill passes the
fourth prong of the Central Hudson test. Because House Bill 2147 success-
fully meets all of Central Hudson's requirements, a reintroduced version of
the Bill likely would be found constitutional. Based upon the principles of the
First Amendment, however, the wisdom of the Bill's provisions is debatable.
B. House Bill 3614
The Tobacco Education and Child Protection Act, House Bill 3614, would
prohibit tobacco companies from displaying tobacco product advertisements
in or on sports facilities.21 The Bill would, however, permit a tobacco
company to engage in sports promotion and sponsorship by exhibiting its
product trademark at sporting events and on vehicles and equipment used in
such events, provided that the company simultaneously disseminates
proportional health information and complies with warning label requirements
for sports equipment." 2 By removing product advertisements and requiring
the sponsor to distribute or display counterspeech, the Bill-like House Bill
2147-attempts to eliminate the association of tobacco products with the
image of a healthy, athletic lifestyle.
As discussed in the preceding analysis of House Bill 2147, the first prong
of the Central Hudson test requires that commercial speech concern legally
permissible acts and not be misleading."3 This rule should present no
constitutional difficulties with tobacco advertising and promotion. Buying,
selling, and using tobacco products are lawful activities, and it is unlikely that
a court would find tobacco sponsorship and promotion of a sport such as
racing to be so misleading as to deny the speech any First Amendment
protection."1' The second criterion of Central Hudson presents a different
picture, however. The government must show a substantial interest in
restricting the speech, and while House Bill 3614 enumerates many of the
same economic and health-related findings as House Bill 2147,2 5 House Bill
3614, in its findings and stated purpose, focuses primarily on the need to
inform adolescents about the adverse effects of tobacco.1 6 Most importantly,
the Bill specifically asserts the government's substantial interest: "[to]
ensur[e] that those who do not use tobacco products are not encouraged to use
them and those who use tobacco products are discouraged from continuing
their use." '217 If one accepts that tobacco products exact a $65 billion drain
in health care costs and productivity annually,1 8 it seems to follow that
210. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2705.
211. H.R. 3614, supra note 13, § 6(b).
212. See supra notes 137 and 142.
213. See supra text accompanying note 170.
214. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
215. H.R. 2147, supra note 5, § 2.
216. H.R. 3614, supra note 13, §§ 2-3.
217. Id. § 3(7).
218. H.R. 2147, supra note 5, § 2(2).
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encouraging nonsmokers not to begin and discouraging current smokers from
continuing qualify as substantial interests.2"9
Under the third part of the Central Hudson analysis, the government must
demonstrate that the speech restriction directly advances its substantial
interest. In the case of House Bill 3614, eliminating speech which casts
smoking in a positive light (advertisements) and ensuring access to current
scientific data (warning labels and "health information") arguably encourages
some nonsmokers not to begin and discourages other current smokers from
continuing. If the legislation removes solicitations to buy tobacco products at
race tracks and ensures that health information is visible each time the
tobacco name or logo confronts the potential consumer at an event, it
probably is not "speculation or conjecture" to suggest that the restrictions
"will ... alleviate [the harms] to a material degree" for some persons.220
Analyzing the advertising and promotion provisions of House Bill 3614
under Central Hudson's fourth requirement, it is apparent that, in comparison
to a prohibition such as that proposed in House Bill 2147, loss of the right to
display product advertisements at sponsored events, together with a require-
ment that the sponsor disseminate counterspeech with the product name and
logo, constitutes a less restrictive alternative. But House Bills 3614 and 2147
set out different governmental interests; therefore, it is irrelevant whether the
milder restrictions of House Bill 3614 would achieve as much as those of
House Bill 2147.22 What is relevant is a determination of the "fit" between
the informational goals of House Bill 3614 and the means chosen to achieve
them. In Central Hudson, the Court recognized that, in lieu of complete
suppression of commercial information, "'some limited supplementation, by
way of warning or disclaimer or the like, might be required' in promotional
materials. '222 This language echoes the seminal Virginia Pharmacy case,
where the Court found that the attributes of commercial speech "may also
make it appropriate to require that a commercial message ... include such
additional information [and] warnings ... as are necessary to prevent its
being deceptive.' '2 3 In the case of House Bill 3614, supplemental informa-
tion about the health hazards of tobacco use constitutes an excellent "fit" with
the informational goals of the Bill.
House Bill 3614 does not appear to burden substantially more speech than
is necessary to further Congress' substantial interests, particularly when
viewed in light of the Court's recent decision in Edge Broadcasting. There,
notwithstanding that ninety-two percent of the radio station's listeners and
ninety-five percent of its advertising revenue were Virginia-based, the Court
219. See generally HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING, supra note 183, at 212 (detailing the
results of studies about knowledge of smoking among adolescents); MATTHEw L. MYERS ET AL.,
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, STAFF REPORT ON THE CIGARETTE ADVERTISING INvESTIGATION 3-1
(1981).
220. Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1800 (1993); see HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING,
supra note 183.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 205-10.
222. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 565 (quoting Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977)).
223. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24.
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held that the North Carolina radio station could not broadcast advertisements
for the Virginia lottery.224 Thus, a regulation which burdens more than
ninety percent of commercial speech does not burden substantially more
speech than necessary. In the case of House Bill 3614, the only question
remaining is whether the government's informational interests "'would be
achieved less effectively absent the regulation.' ' 225 Two obvious possibili-
ties for achieving the government's informational interests are: (1) prohibiting
product advertisements in or on sports facilities (as does House Bill 3614); or
(2) requiring the tobacco sponsor to display warning labels on equipment that
features the product name or logo and to disseminate "health information" (as
House Bill 3614 also does). But neither option independently would be as
effective as the combination of the two, since each has the tendency to
reinforce the other. Hence, in terms of current commercial speech doctrine,
it is likely that a reintroduced version of House Bill 3614's advertising and
promotion provisions would pass constitutional muster by furthering a
legitimate government interest without unduly burdening tobacco
manufacturers' speech.
C. Proposed Amendment of the Comprehensive
Smokeless Tobacco Act of 1986
The Federal Trade Commission's proposed rulemaking to amend 16 C.F.R.
§ 307.9 would require racing cars sponsored by smokeless tobacco manufac-
turers to carry the same health warning statements currently mandated for
smokeless tobacco packages.22 6 The amendment also applies to "utilitarian"
items such as vehicles, banners, flags, signs, and uniforms displaying the
brand name, logo, or selling message of any smokeless tobacco product. 2 7
This regulation would apply to any type of public entertainment, with or
without an audience (e.g., caps and clothing).228
Under the first prong of the four-part Central Hudson test, there is no
suggestion in the proposed amendment that smokeless tobacco is an unlawful
product, and sponsorship of racing events by smokeless tobacco companies in
all likelihood does not amount to misleading advertisement or promotion.229
Since the FTC's proposed rulemaking simply brings smokeless tobacco-
sponsored racing cars and "utilitarian" equipment into compliance with the
Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act, the government
interest derives from the language of that Act. The rotating package warning
messages suggest that smokeless tobacco may cause mouth cancer, gum
224. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct., at 2702, 2707-08.
225. Id. at 2705 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989)).
226. See supra text accompanying notes 144-46. As noted previously, as of the time of this writing,
the amendment had yet to be adopted.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 145-46.
228. See supra note 146.
229. See supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
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disease, and tooth loss, and that it is "not a safe alternative to cigarettes."23
Based upon the health risks of smokeless tobacco, the government appears to
have a substantial interest in providing warnings wherever brand names,
logos, or selling messages appear.23" ' The warning labels directly advance
the government's interest in providing health information; 23 2 based on the
health risk to adolescents and adults from using smokeless tobacco, there is
a reasonable fit between the end sought and the means chosen. 233 As with
House Bill 3614, no less restrictive alternative is available which is capable
of serving the government's substantial interest.
IV. DISCUSSION
Both of the legislative schemes currently under consideration in Congress,
together with the proposed rulemaking for smokeless tobacco, pass constitu-
tional muster under the existing commercial speech doctrine. In light of the
magnitude of the tobacco problem in the United States, it would seem that the
obvious resolution would be to pass the strictest version capable of gaining
a two-thirds majority in each House. But the obvious answer frequently is not
the best answer. In addition to First Amendment concerns about the autonomy
of an individual to make his or her own choice, 3 4 such legislation also
raises the question whether complete elimination of information, albeit in but
one sphere, offers the best solution in terms of constitutional principles.
In Virginia Pharmacy, Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority,
concluded that the protection of the First Amendment extends not only to the
source and the communication, but to the recipient as well.235 Though purely
commercial speech enjoys a lesser protection than does political speech,2 36
suppression is not the appropriate remedy when the government may instead
230. 15 U.S.C. § 4402(1).
231. See supra text accompanying notes 218-20. In 1989, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia ordered the Federal Trade Commission to repeal its exemption for "utilitarian"
items, pointing out that
Congress has determined that only a comprehensive approach will adequately address the
problem: rather than settling for the minimum possible, Congress' scheme appears quite clearly
designed to guarantee that each time one sees a smokeless tobacco product promoted in a
favorable light, there will appear along with it the omnipresent reminder of the dangers
associated with its use. This determination is consistent with our own understanding of the
benefits of repeated warnings: only constant reminders of the health dangers associated with
smokeless tobacco will effectively offset the persuasive power of the industry's advertisements
promoting its use.
Public Citizen v. FTC, 869 F.2d 1541, 1549 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (footnote omitted).
232. See supra text accompanying note 220.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 223-25. Smokeless tobacco is included in the provisions of
both House Bill 2147, supra note 5, and House Bill 3614, supra note 13.
234. See supra text accompanying note 20.
235. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 756.
236. United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696, 2703 (1993); Board of Trustees v.
Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 563 (1980).
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require a lawful speaker to supplement an "inaccurate" commercial message
with additional information.237 The Supreme Court has held that
the people in our democracy are entrusted with the responsibility for
judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments. They
may consider, in making their judgment, the source and credibility of the
advocate. But if there be any danger that the people cannot evaluate the
information and arguments ... it is a danger contemplated by the Framers
of the First Amendment.238
Thus, the Constitution embodies the idea that the greater the recipient's access
to information, the more likely it is that the person will make an intelligent
and informed decision.
The problem with the tobacco industry's advertising and promotional
schemes, then, is that the companies have a near monopoly on the flow of
information to the audience, some of whose members may not initially have
had any interest in its message. The people cannot "evaluat[e] the relative
merits of conflicting arguments '239 when there is no alternative view in the
domain where the speaker propounds his view. The tobacco industry spends
over $4 billion annually 240 on advertising and promotion, and a significant
proportion of that amount finds its way to a medium where counterspeech is
absent and an aura of glamour is present. Manipulation is not the province of
the government in this case, but that of the tobacco industry.
Where House Bill 2147 makes it unlawful for a tobacco company to sponsor
a sporting event while displaying the name or logo of a tobacco product,
House Bill 3614 allows tobacco manufacturers to sponsor such events so long
as the manufacturers make available the required health information and
warning messages. 24' The latter approach is by far the preferable one, for
two reasons. First, a free enterprise economy depends upon the ability of the
people to make intelligent and well-informed decisions, even where public
acceptance and use of a product is considerably less than unanimous. As
Justice Blackmun noted in Virginia Pharmacy:
Even if the differences [between fully protected speech and commercial
speech] do not justify the conclusion that commercial speech is valueless,
and thus subject to complete suppression by the State, they nonetheless
suggest that a different degree of protection is necessary to insure that the
flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information is unimpaired.242
By removing tobacco product names and logos from areas of entertainment
such as racing, Congress surely cannot hope to keep adolescents in ignorance
237. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24.
238. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791-92 (1978) (footnote omitted).
239. Id. at 791.
240. H.R. 3614, supra note 13, § 3.
241. While the provisions of House Bill 2147 might prove unfavorable to the interests of tobacco
marketers, the burden of compliance under House Bill 3614 would be comparatively light. See generally
supra part III.B. Moreover, since tobacco manufacturers claim to be interested only in attracting smokers
of competing brands and retaining their own loyal customers-as opposed to attracting new tobacco
users-the tobacco industry would have little room to complain about House Bill 3614's counterspeech
provision. See supra note 18 and accompanying text; see generally supra notes 30, 116, and text
accompanying notes 114-15.
242. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24.
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of tobacco's existence.243 Therefore, completely eliminating advertising of
a lawful product-particularly in an arena where adolescents do not predomi-
nate244-annot be justified in a free market economy.
Second, if Congress succeeds in removing tobacco advertising from
motorsports through enactment of a reintroduced version of House Bill 2147,
any possibility of presenting counterspeech against the harmful effects of
tobacco products will disappear. By enacting a reintroduced version of House
Bill 3614 in its stead, Congress retains a competing voice in the messages
adolescents receive in an area where the potential for influence is bound to
exist. This, in turn, allows adolescents to make informed, autonomous
decisions. In Posadas, the Supreme Court concluded that "it is up to the
legislature to decide whether or not... a counterspeech policy would be as
effective in reducing ... demand ... as a restriction on advertising.
' '245
With House Bill 3614, Congress has proposed such a counterspeech policy,
albeit in combination with a selective restriction on advertising. This
legislative scheme offers the best solution for all interests.
CONCLUSION
The effects of tobacco use in late twentieth-century America are an
unprecedented human tragedy, the social cost of which exceeds the sum of all
other public health problems. Yet, notwithstanding the efforts of some
members of Congress, tobacco is too firmly rooted in American culture to be
eradicated in a short time. During the past eight years, numerous legislative
attempts to deal with the problem have fallen short of the mark, and at this
time the only certainty is that these efforts will continue.
Understandably, those who witness the decimation of human life and
productivity caused by tobacco use seek to eliminate the areas where tobacco
manufacturers operate without constraints. But the tobacco problem cannot be
solved by doing violence to the principles of individual liberty. While
commercial speech itself may enjoy a lesser value in the hierarchy of
protected communication, the rights of the listener also must be given due
consideration.24 6 Toward that end, legislation which eliminates overt product
advertisement in certain limited circumstances (such as display in sports
facilities), while permitting the American institution of corporate image
advertising and preserving the right of individuals to make rational, autono-
mous choices through a requirement of counterspeech, offers the best
available compromise.
243. But cf supra text accompanying notes 86-96 (finding that children's identification of cigarette
brand names is clearly enhanced by tobacco company sponsorship of televised sporting events).
244. See supra text accompanying note 83.
245. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 344.
246. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977) ("The listener's interest is substantial: the
constitutional concern for the free flow of commercial speech often may be far keener than his concern
for urgent political dialogue.").
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